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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year the Review presents a survey of labor law' which dis-
cusses the important developments in decisional law affecting labor
relations under the Labor-Management Relations Act' and the Norris-
LaGuardia Acta This year's Survey is the ninth in this series. It has
drawn upon the decisions of state and federal courts and the National
Labor Relations Board which have been handed down during the year
ending March 1, 1970.
During the Survey year the Supreme Court handed down opin-
1 The previous comments are: 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law,
10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785 (1969). Labor Law—Decisions on Jurisdictional Prob-
lems, 9 B.C. Ind. & Coro. L. Rev. 1059 (1968); 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Re-
lations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 771 (1967); 1965-1966 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909 (1966); 1964-1965 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 815 (1965); Recent Developments in
Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent Developments in Labor
Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 661 (1963); Labor's New Frontier: The End of the




 29 U.S.C. f f 101-15 (1964).
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ions on the names and addresses rule,' the power of the NLRB to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement, ° and the use of authori-
zation cards.° Lower federal courts amplified many of these issues,
and advanced into new areas, in particular with respect to the bar-
gaining technique known as "Boulwareism," 7 the principles of multi-
party abritration,8 and the civil rights of employees.' The NLRB
raised some interesting questions on the basic conflict between the
union's need for self-preservation and the employees' right to Board
action,' but the chef-d'oeuvre of the Board was its decision subjecting
major league baseball to the national labor laws.
II. BOARD AND COURT JURISDICTION
A. NLRB Jurisdiction over Professional Baseball
In American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,' decided
during the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board held
that professional baseball is subject to the Board's jurisdiction because
baseball is an industry affecting interstate commerce. The petitioner,
an association of umpires employed by the American League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs, urged the Board to assert jurisdiction over
its request for a union representation election. The League argued
that the Board, pursuant to the discretion authorized by section
14(c) (1) of the LMRA,2 should as a matter of policy not assert
jurisdiction, and moved to have the petition dismissed. The Board
denied this request.
The Board's jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act
evolves from the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.'
Despite the fact that none of the parties to the litigation contended
that professional baseball is not involved in interstate commerce, the
Board felt compelled, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Fed-
eral Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,' to decide this issue. In Federal Baseball Club the Supreme
Court held that professional baseball was not interstate in nature, and
therefore was not subject to the antitrust laws. The Board in American
League declined to follow Federal Baseball Club, reasoning that since
4 See pp. 930-933 infra.
6 See pp. 969-971 infra.
8 See pp. 933-940 infra.
7 See pp. 956-963 infra.
8 See pp. 948-952 infra.
9 See pp. 952-955 infra.
10 See pp. 963-966 infra.
1 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 72 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1969).
2 29 U.S.C. 3 164(c) (1) (1964).
3 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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professional football' and boxing' have been held to be involved in
interstate commerce it could no longer be seriously contended that the
Supreme Court still considers professional baseball to be outside of
interstate commerce.
The employer urged that the Board should decline to assert
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 14(c) (1) of the LMRA. 7 Under this
section the Board may refuse to assert jurisdiction over a labor dis-
pute when, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant Board action.
The employer contended that because of baseball's system of internal
self-regulation of labor problems, any labor dispute is not likely to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In rejecting this
argument, the Board noted that baseball's system of internal self-
regulation had been designed almost entirely by the employer, and
the final arbitrator of internal labor disputes is an individual ap-
pointed solely by the baseball club owners. Thus, the Board decided
that it would be contrary to the spirit of the NLRA for the Board to
defer its undoubted jurisdiction to a settlement system established
unilaterally by an employer.
The employer also argued that the petition should be dismissed
on the ground that baseball umpires are supervisors as defined in
Section 2(11) 8 of the Act. Therefore, the employer reasoned, umpires
are not "employees" within the meaning of section 2 (3),' and thus
are not guaranteed the section 7 right to self organization. The Board
rejected this argument, ruling that since umpires are not employed to
"discipline" or "direct" a work force, but rather to assure that the
game is played in compliance with predetermined rules, they are not
to be considered supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act.
Member Jenkins dissented, reasoning that pursuant to the dis-
cretionary authority provided for in section 14(c) (1), the Board
should refuse to assert jurisdiction because there had been no showing
that the kinds of labor disputes which are likely to constitute a bur-
den on interstate commerce occur in the professional baseball indus-
try. Moreover, Jenkins urged that there was reason to suspect that
baseball's system for internal self-regulation of disputes would not
prevent a disruption of commerce.
The members of this year's Survey share Member Jenkins' obvi-
ous love for The Game. However, in light of the power exerted by the
owners over those who derive their livelihood from The Game, the
majority's willingness to assert jurisdiction is to be welcomed. More-
over, members of this year's Survey applaud the majority's willingness
5
 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
6
 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
7 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1964).
9 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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to decline to follow Federal Baseball Club. In this day it can hardly
be questioned that baseball is involved in interstate commerce. In-
deed, there was some question as to the correctness of the Supreme
Court's holding in 1922. On the day before Federal Baseball Club
was promulgated a great fever for The Game had infected many in
the Capital city. Only a few hours before the decision was handed
down, Walter "Big Train" Johnson, pitching for the Washington Na-
tionals, had held Babe Ruth to five weak infield taps and had beaten
the famed Sam Jones in ten innings." Prophetically enough, Joe
Judge delivered the big hit for Washington. On the next day the
Court, apparently overlooking the 20,000 people who came to view
the Babe from New York," ruled that baseball was not involved in
interstate commerce.
B. NLRB Jurisdiction Over Labor Disputes
against Political Subdivisions
In ILWU, Local 16 v. City of Juneau,' decided during the Survey
year, the Board ruled that it has jurisdiction under the National
Labor Relations Act to relieve secondary pressure applied by a union
where the boycotted employer is not an employer as defined by the
Act and the boycotting parties are employed by a company which is
also not an employer as defined by the Act.
Local 16, the respondent Union, represented employees of the
City of Juneau, Alaska. On March 27, 1963 the City and the union
entered into an agreement that a minimum crew of two union long-
shoremen would be used for tie-up and cast-off work on ferry boats
using the docking terminal of the City. On April 30, 1968 the City
informed the union that all future ferry tie-up work would be per-
formed by non-union employees of the City. Subsequent to this
announcement a state owned ferry manned by state employees ap-
proached the Juneau city dock which was being picketed by members
of Local 16. Lines from the ferry were cast to non-union personnel
who performed the tie-up work. The crew of the ferry, respecting the
picket line, refused to unload the baggage from the ferry.
A section 8(b) (4) (B) 2 action was brought by the City in an
effort to end the picketing of Local 16 at the dock, the Board was
faced with a jurisdictional question of first impression. The Board,
with Member Jenkins dissenting, accepted jurisdiction over the mat-
ter and then dismissed the complaint on the ground that the union's
picketing was protected activity under section 8(b) (4)(B), because
the effect of the picketing was primary and not secondary in nature.
10 New York Times, May 30, 1922 at 11, col. 2 (city ed.).
11 Id.
1 176 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 71 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1969).
2 29	 § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
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Sections 2(2) and (3) of the LMRA 3 exclude from the definitions
of employee and employer any employee or employer which is a state
or political subdivision. In his dissent Member Jenkins, admitting
that section 8(b) (4) (B) does prohibit secondary activity affecting
"persons," argued that none of the parties to the dispute were "em-
ployers" or "employees" as defined in Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the
Act. Jenkins argued that though Congress intended to relieve second-
ary pressure applied to exempt employers by unions subect to the Act,
there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended to provide relief when both the boycotted employer and the
employees of the boycotting employer are exempt. Therefore, he
argued, the Board should not accept jurisdiction over the controversy.
The majority agreed with Member Jenkins' conclusion that none
of the parties to the dispute were employees or employers as defined
by the Act, and that section 8(b) (4) (B) expressly condemns second-
ary activity which affects "persons." The majority reasoned, however,
that because section 8(b) (4) (B) contains no language limiting its
scope to disputes involving those who fit within the statutory defini-
tions of "employer" and "employee" as do other sections of the Act,'
there is no reason to refuse to accept jurisdiction over a dispute where
the complaint was filed by a party who section 8(b) (4) (B) was de-
signed to protect,' even in the absence of a clear congressional man-
date authorizing the Board to act when both the boycotted employer
and the boycotting parties are exempt.
The majority's expansive interpretation of the jurisdictional
reach of the Board under section 8(b) (4)(B) is not only a reasonable
interpretation of the language of that section but also will best achieve
the purposes of that section. Section 8 (b) (4) (B) is designed to limit
the adverse secondary effects of picketing. By interpreting the section
so as to allow states and political subdivisions burdened by secondary
pressure to seek relief from the Board this purpose will be more
widely accomplished.
C. Pre-emption: State Court Jurisdiction Over
Labor Disputes Involving Foreign Vessels
Much of the sea borne commerce of the United States is trans-
acted through the medium of foreign-flag vessels which load and
unload their cargo in American ports. The crews of foreign-flag vessels
are employed subject to ship's articles which are signed under the
law of the port at which the seaman enters the ship's service. For this
reason the employment conditions of the ship's crew are regulated by
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2) & (3) (1964).
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) & 159 (1964).
5 The majority argued that the legislative history indicates that Congress intended
that § 8(b)(4)(B) "be given full effect in protecting municipal and state govern-
ments . . „" 176 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1307. The legislative history relied
on by the Board as authority for this position is sparse.
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foreign law and by long-standing international custom.' The frequent
involvement of foreign-flag vessels in the commerce of the United
States has raised the question of whether the National Labor Rela-
tions Act applies to situations in which the hours, wages and condi-
tions of employment of the members of the foreign-flag ship's crew
are involved.
In Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo S.A.,' the Supreme Court
held that picketing of a foreign-flag vessel by members of an American
seaman's union for the purpose of supporting the crew's demands
for more favorable conditions of employment was not protected by
the Act. Later, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras,' the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board
could not, pursuant to the Act, order a representation election among
the members of a foreign-flag vessel's crew. On the same day, in
incres Steamship Co. v. Maritime Workers Union,' the Court held that
the protection of the Act did not extend to unions which are formed
for the purpose of organizing the crews of foreign ships. The reasoning
of the Court in each of the three cases was based on the premise that
the National Labor Relations Act was primarily aimed at the struggle
between American employees and American employers. In interpreting
the Act, the Court could find neither explicit nor implicit intent on the
part of the Congress to involve the NLRB in international relations. It
concluded that the Act did not extend Board jurisdiction, or concomi-
tant federal protection, to the "internal discipline and order of all
foreign vessels calling at American ports."' To have held otherwise
would have inevitably brought American labor policy into direct con-
flict with the international law principle and the numerous international
treaty obligations which recognize that the law of the flag-state governs
the internal affairs of the ship and,' more importantly, would have
created a situation in which a Board decision could provoke "vigorous
protests from foreign governments and . . . [create] questions of such
international import . . . as to invite retaliatory action from other
nations . . . ." 7
Because the Board is not empowered to resolve disputes involv-
ing the "internal discipline and order" of foreign-flag vessels, state
courts are not pre-empted by federal law from applying state laws and
regulations.' In ILA, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.° decided
during the Survey year, the Supreme Court was required to decide
1 For a brief discussion, see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
2 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
8 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
4 Id. at 24.
Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 21.
7 Id. at 17-21.
8 Id. at 24.
9 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
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whether the NLRA preempted the application of Florida state law in
the context of a labor dispute involving foreign-flag vessels. The dispute
in Ariadne arose when members of a logshoremen's union in the Miami
area were enjoined from picketing a foreign-flag vessel. The union had
been picketing to protest the substandard wages of American long-
shoremen who were hired as casual employees to assist the ship's crew
in loading and unloading the vessel. Before granting the injunction
under Florida law, the Circuit Court of Dade County decided that the
NLRA did not apply to the picketing. In affirming this decision, the
district court, citing McCulloch and Incres, reasoned that the NLRA
did not apply to situations involving foreign-flag vessels. Review was
denied by the Supreme Court of Florida in an unreported opinion. In
reversing the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court noted that Benz, McCulloch and Incres, involved situa-
tions where the union activity sought to alter the "internal discipline and
order" of a foreign-flag ship. In the Court's view, the union activity
in Ariadne properly sought to alter the work conditions of American
employees who were not hired as part of the ship's crew. The union
activity did not conflict with foreign law or international custom
because it did not seek to affect the arrangements between the foreign-
flag vessel and the crew, and, therefore, it was activity protected by
the NLRA. Consequently, the Court held that the Florida state
courts' injunctive decrees were improperly issued since the courts' juris-
diction to issue injunctions under Florida law had been pre-empted by
the Act.
The holding in Ariadne appears to limit McCulloch, Incres and
Benz to situations where the union activity is an attempt to influence
the work conditions of crew members whose work relationship is
controlled by foreign law. However, the Court expressly put to one
side the situation in which longshore work on an American dock is
carried out entirely by a ship's crew according to the foreign ship's
articles. 10
 Since this exception comes in the context of a case which
recognizes the protected status of employees who are not working
pursuant to the foreign ship's articles, it is reasonable to assume that
if a case arises in which the picketing is directed solely at crew mem-
bers of foreign-flag vessels, even when they are working on American
docks, the Court will view it as a McCulloch situation in which state
jurisdiction will not be pre-empted. Clearly, the McCulloch logic is
more applicable to the excepted circumstances than to Ariadne. In
Ariadne, the union only sought to affect the conditions of employees
who were hired in the United States and who were not in any way
subject to foreign law. On the other hand, in a situation where a
union seeks to organize crewmen who are subject to the law of the
foreign-flag vessel, but who are engaged in longshoremen's work, the
NLRA is brought into direct conflict with the law governing ship's
I° 397 U.S. at 199 n.4.
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articles. Presumably, the same international repercussions described
in McCulloch are potentially present here. However, the ship's crew,
by working on the dock, may be depleting the work assignments
available to organized longshoremen. McCulloch suggests that any
attempt to organize the foreign crew would not be protected by the
Act, but if Ariadne is extended, it would appear that picketing to
protest the loss of work assignments is protected activity under the
Act.
D. Judicial Review of Board Decisions
During this Survey year the Supreme Court in NLRB v. J.H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.1
 decided that a court of appeals may not reduce
a Board back pay award on the ground that inordinate delay by the
Board in violation of the Board's duty of prompt action under the
Administrative Procedure Ace allegedly resulted in more extensive
back pay liability of the employer. The Court's decision reveals
conflicting views on the proper role of the circuit courts in reviewing
Board rulings and of the Supreme Court in reviewing circuit court
decisions in the field of labor relations.
The facts which culminated in the Rutter-Rex decision began
with a strike by the union against the company in April, 1954. Charges
of a refusal to bargain in good faith were filed against the company.
While these charges were pending, the union terminated the strike
and many of the strikers applied for reinstatement. The company only
reinstated some of the strikers.
In February, 1956 the Board ruled that the company had unlaw-
fully refused to bargain and ordered the company to offer reinstate-
ment to all strikers who had applied, and to "make such applicants
whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the ... refusal, if any,
to reinstate them."' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit en-
forced the Board's order.' Following this decision the Board's regional
office sent the company a letter which described the compliance
procedures the company must follow' Several months after receipt of
the letter the company wrote to the regional office of the Board stating
that it had complied with "some of the provisions of the decree," and
asking the regional office to inform the company of any failure to
comply with the order. The regional office did not answer this corn-
1 396 U.S. 258 (1969).
2 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)(A) (1964), provides that
courts shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . ."
3 396 U.S. at 260.
4 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 594, 40 L.R.R.M. 2213 (5th Cir.
1957).
5 Included in the letter was the following:
"When you have fully complied with the affirmative terms of the decree
and there are no violations of its negative provisions, you will be notified that
the case has been closed. Until you receive such notice you will know that the
case remains open for all purposes as awaiting compliance."
396 U.S. at 260.
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munication, and the company was not contacted by the Board until
March, 1960, when a Board compliance officer requested certain com-
pany records necessary to determine the employment and backpay
rights of employees. On November 16, 1961 the regional office filed
a backpay specification, alleging that the company owed a total of
more than $342,000 to some 207 strikers. The company, arguing that
the Board had delayed improperly in issuing the backpay specifica-
tion, requested from the court of appeals a permanent stay of further
action in the backpay proceedings.'
The court of appeals denied the requested stay.' A hearing was
then held before a trial examiner who determined the exact amount of
back wages the company would be required to pay. The Board, adopt-
ing the findings of the trial examiner,' again rejected the company's
contention that because of the delay in issuing the specification the
backpay award should either be barred or reduced.
The employer appealed the case and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that the Board had been &illy of "inordinate"
delay, in violation of Section 6(a)' of the Administrative Procedure
Act," which delay had prejudiced the company. The court stated that
by the Board's inaction the company had been "lulled into the belief
that the Board was satisfied and that no further action was to be
expected." The court then reduced the back pay awards to what it
considered to be fair considering the "inordinate" delay by the Board.
The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Har-
lan and Douglas dissenting, reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals. Both the majority and dissenting opinions recognized that
the legitimacy of a backpay award as a remedy for unlawful failure
to reinstate or unlawful discharge is beyond dispute. The majority
and dissent differed, however, as to the proper standard for review of
Board remedial orders. In his majority opinion Justice Marshall em-
phasized that the remedial power of the Board is broadly discretionary
and subject to limited judicial review." He also noted that the purpose
of the backpay order is to vindicate the public policy of the statute
by compensating employees for losses caused by an unfair labor prac-
tice,' and that as with the other Board remedies, the power to order
backpay "is for the Board to wield, not for the Courts.""
6 In an affidavit, the Board explained that the delay was caused in part by the
great complexity of the case, the extremely heavy caseload and severely limited staff.
396 U.S. at 261.
7 NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 305 F.2d 242, 50 L.R.R.M. 2770 (5th' Cir.
1962).
8 158 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966).
9 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1964).
10 J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356, 68 L.R.R.M. 2916 (5th Cir.
1968).
11 The majority cited Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB 379 U.S. 203 (1964),
in support of this proposition.
12 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
13
 The Court cited NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
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Justice Marshall pointed out that both the employees and the
employer were injured by the delay of the Board, and either the com-
pany or the employees had to bear the cost of the delay. The Court
held that the decision of the court of appeals shifting the cost of the
Board's delay from the employer to the employees, exceeded the nar-
row scope of review over the Board's remedial power.
The dissenters, speaking through Justice Douglas, argued that
under the rule set down in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB," the
decision of the court of appeals should not be disturbed. In Universal
Camera the Supreme Court held that the courts of appeals were vested
with general supervisory responsibility over Board decisions and
orders, and that the Supreme Court should only intervene when a
court of appeals misapprehends or grossly misapplies a rule. In the
opinion of the dissenters the court of appeals had acted within its
power and the Supreme Court should not upset its decision because,
under the doctrine of Universal Camera, the courts of appeals and
not the Supreme Court are the watchdog of the Board.
It would seem that the disagreement between the majority and
the dissenters in Rutter-Rex was caused by different philosophies con-
cerning the scope of review of the Supreme Court over decisions by
the courts of appeals in cases arising under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The NLRA is silent on the standard to be employed by
the Supreme Court in reviewing decisions of the courts of appeals in
cases arising under the Act. In Universal Camera the Supreme Court
defined its role as a rather limited one. The decision of the majority
in Rutter-Rex seems to signal a swing away from the philosophy of
Universal Camera and constitutes an expansion of the Supreme Court's
role as watchdog of the courts of appeals in labor matters.
E. Pre-emption: State Court Jurisdiction Over
Internal Union Matters
The NLRB was given by the Congress primary responsibility
for the interpretation and application of the NLRAl In a series of
decisions the Supreme Court has attempted to adjust the relationship
of federal and state powers in the labor relations area in the hope of
accommodating state interests in regulating its internal affairs and
federal interests in effectuating the policies embodied in the NLRA.
The first important case to examine the relationship between state
and federal labor policy was Garner v. Teamsters Union,2 in which
the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania was pre-empted in its at-
tempt to enjoin union picketing. The Court ruled that the lawfulness
of the picketing in Garner was a matter for the NLRB and not the
state courts. The Court reasoned that Congress in the NLRA
14
 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
1
 29 U.S.C. { 160 (1954).
2 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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had created a new tribunal with its own procedures and rem-
edies to administer a comprehensive system of regulations. State in-
terference with any part of the system might damage the federal
structure and the national labor policy. Thus, the Court held that
when a state court is asked to grant a remedy which could also be
granted under federal labor legislation, state action is pre-empted.
The next important decision in this area was United Construc-
tion Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,' in which the Su-
preme Court ruled that state power to award damages for tortious
conduct arising out of a labor dispute was not pre-empted, even
though the conduct involved might well have constituted an unfair
labor practice. In Laburnum the Supreme Court distinguished Garner
on the ground that Garner involved the granting of a remedy by a
state court which was parallel to a remedy available under federal
labor law. The Laburnum case, the Court held, did not involve such
a conflict of remedies because Congress did not provide or suggest
any substitute for state procedures providing collective damages for
injuries caused by tortious conduct. Thus, after Laburnum, in deter-
mining whether state action was pre-empted the proper test seemed to
be whether or not the NLRB was empowered to grant the same relief
that the state court was asked to provide. If the NLRB was so em-
powered then state courts were pre-empted from acting.
Shortly after Laburnum, Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc' was
decided. In this case the Supreme Court held that an injunction
against a labor organization could not be issued under state antitrust
law. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, reiterated the
rule of Garner. State court jurisdiction is pre-empted if the remedy
the state court is asked to give, has a parallel under federal labor
law. Then, in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,' the
Supreme Court expanded the Garner test:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enact-
ment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.'
Although the Garmon doctrine extends to any labor activities
that are "arguably" protected by the Act, 7
 action by the state courts
has not been entirely pre-empted. The Court in Garmon recognized
some activities over which state jurisdiction must be allowed. Thus,
3 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
4 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
6 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6 Id. at 244.
7
 "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted." 359 U.S. at 245.
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where the regulated conduct touches interests deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility a court in the absence of compelling congres-
sional direction, should not infer that Congress has deprived the
States of the power to act. Garman thus narrowed the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction to conduct which threatened public order
or which was not relevant to national policy.
In Lockridge v. Motor Coach Employees,' decided during the
Survey year, the Idaho Supreme Court was required to decide whether
the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state court jurisdiction
to rule on whether a union member has been improperly expelled
from membership in the union for alleged non-payment of dues. The
Idaho Supreme Court, with one member dissenting, held that it had
jurisdiction over the dispute.
The union contended that federal pre-emption under the LMRA
precluded all state court jurisdiction over union-member relationships.
The union member's dismissal, the union contended, was protected ac-
tivity under the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A) ° of the NLRA. More-
over if the union had improperly dismissed the employee then it had
committed an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(b) (1)
(A) and 8(b) (2)." Because the union's conduct was arguably either
protected or prohibited by the Act, state action, the union argued, was
pre-empted under the Garmon rule. The Idaho Supreme Court con-
ceded that the conduct of the union was subject to the NLRA and
that therefore if Garmon were the only test to be applied its jurisdic-
tion would be pre-empted. The Court found, however, that the con-
duct of the union also amounted to a breach of contract between
itself and the union member, and held that it was not without jurisdic-
tion to remedy this breach. The majority of the court ruled that "pre-
emption is not established simply by showing that the same facts will
sustain two different legal wrongs. This would be analogous to pre-
cluding a contract action by proving the facts also establish a tort.'
The majority opinion relies heavily on the pre-Garmon Supreme
Court decision of IAM v. • Gonzales, 12 which upheld a state court
decision ordering reinstatement for a union member who had been
wrongfully expelled from union membership. In Lockridge the ap-
pellant union argued that Gonzales should not be relied on. Rather,
they contended, the "arguably subject" test set forth in Garmon
should be applied. The union based its argument on two post-Garmon
cases: Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v.
Borden" and Iron Workers Union v. Perko. 14 In these cases the
Supreme Court, over dissents by Justices Douglas and Clark, ruled
8 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d 719 (1969).
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
10 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
11 93 Idaho at 299, 460 P.2d at 725.
12 IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
13 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
14 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
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that if the union conduct complained of concerned alleged interference
with the employee's existing or prospective employment relations and
was not directed primarily to internal union matters then state court
jurisdiction was pre-empted. Gonzales was distinguished on the ground
that the lawsuit there was concerned with relations between the
individual plaintiff and the union and did not directly affect matters
of employment. Thus, state court jurisdiction as to these purely in-
ternal matters was not pre-empted.
The majority in Lockridge accepted the Borden-Perko reasoning
but found that the action was concerned with purely internal matters.
The dissent argued that this finding is clearly erroneous. Because
the main thrust of the employee's desired remedy does not deal with
a purely internal union matter the Borden-Perko rule precludes state
court jurisdiction.
The questions raised by the Lockridge case point out the prob-
lems that continue to infect the area of federal pre-emption in labor
disputes. Since the Supreme Court has not yet passed on the issue of
whether the holding in Garmon qualified the principles declared in
Gonzales, confused and protracted litigation will continue to result.
The problems with the Garmon test are many. During the Survey
year two Supreme Court cases were handed down which indicate that
a reconsideration of Garmon may be in the offing.
F. Garmon—A Reconsideration
As is evident from the previous section, the law in the area of
federal pre-emption under the Garmon doctrine is not without prob-
lems. The problems created by the necessity of determining what is
conduct "arguably" protected or prohibited under the Taft-Hartley
Act are many. Where the Board has not ruled that particular conduct
is protected or prohibited by the Act it is relatively easy for a union
to convince a state court that the conduct is arguably subject to the
Act. In those instances where a state court has decided that particular
conduct is arguably subject to the Act it is impossible for an employer
to obtain relief without committing an unfair labor practice, thereby
forcing the Board to decide whether the conduct is subject to the
Act. During this Survey year, two Supreme Court cases were decided
in which strong indications were given that a reconsideration of Gar-
mon may be forthcoming. In ILA, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co. 1
the Supreme Court reversed a Florida court order enjoining peaceful
picketing by a union holding that state court jurisdiction was, under
the Garmon doctrine, pre-empted. In a concurring opinion, however,
Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
joined, stated that:
So long as employers are effectively denied determina-
tions by the NLRB as to whether "arguably protected"
1 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
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picketing is actually protected except when an employer is
willing to threaten or use force to deal with picketing, I
would hold that only labor activity determined to be ac-
tually, rather than arguably protected under federal law
should be immune from state judicial control. To this extent
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon should be re-
considered.'
In another picketing case decided during the Survey year, Tag-
gart v. Weinacker's, Inc.,' the Supreme Court dismissed a writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. The majority of the Court con-
cluded that the writ should be dismissed because the record of the
case was obscure and because little of the original controversy re-
mained. Justices Black and Harlan felt that the decision of the
Alabama court granting an injunction against a union's picketing on
a sidewalk owned by the employer should be reversed under the
Garmon doctrine, since the activity complained of was arguably pro-
tected by the Act.
Chief Justice Burger concurred with the decision of the majority.
However, in his separate opinion he stated:
In my view any contention that the States are pre-
empted in these circumstances is without merit. The protec-
tion of private property, whether a home, factory, or store,
through trespass law is historically a concern of state law.
Congress has never undertaken to alter this allocation of
power, and has provided no remedy to an employer within
the National Labor Relations Act to prevent an illegal tres-
pass on his premises.4
In reaching his conclusion Justice Burger relied upon Garmon,
wherein the Court stated that even if conduct is arguably prohibited
or protected by the Act, state court jurisdiction to deal with such
conduct is not pre-empted if the matter is one of compelling state
interest.' Justice Burger's reference to the states' concern with rem-
edying trespass is directed at this aspect of the Garmon test.
The concurring opinions in these two cases are indications that
in the near future the Garmon rule may be reconsidered, or at least
more liberally construed. The concurring opinion in Ariadne Shipping
would seem to give the best indication of the form any change in
Garmon may take. The three judges apparently would not apply
their "actually" protected test in all pre-emption cases. Rather, state
courts should only be pre-empted where the conduct complained of is
actually protected or prohibited by the Act and the employer has no
recourse to the Board apart from the commission of an unfair labor
2 Id. at 202.
3 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
4 Id. at 227.
5 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1958).
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practice.° The Garmon test would be retained in cases where, under
present federal labor law, adequate means of determining the validity
of the concerted activity are provided.
It would seem that the opinion of the concurring judges in
Ariadne Shipping is a result of their dissatisfaction with the remedial
void that the Garmon decision has created. Under Garmon, state
court jurisdiction is pre-empted even in areas in which the National
Labor Relations Act fails to provide an effective mechanism by which
an employer can obtain a determination from the Board as to whether
picketing, for example, is protected or unprotected.
The concurring opinion in Ariadne Shipping would solve the prob-
lems created when state court jurisdiction under Garmon is pre-
empted and the Board does not or cannot assert its jurisdiction.
However, it can be argued that if Ariadne were to become law the
policy of the National Labor Relations Act would be weakened. By
the Act Congress formulated a comprehensive regulatory structure in
which the Board was assigned the duty of assuring uniform applica-
tion among the states of the federal labor policy. The Supreme Court's
decision in Garmon attempted to insure that this goal would be
achieved by foreclosing state action in labor activities which are
"arguably" protected or prohibited by the Act.'
Garmon is in most cases an effective way of answering the diffi-
cult questions of pre-emption that arise in labor disputes. The weak-
ness in the Garmon doctrine pointed out by the concurring judges—
that the Act provides no legal means by which an employer can deter-
mine whether union picketing is protected or prohibited—is a flaw
in the Act itself which Congress should correct. However, it does not
appear that a change in the Garmon doctrine as suggested by the
concurring judges is advisable. Though use of an "actually pro-
tected" test would in some situations relieve employers of the necessity
of committing an unfair labor practice in order to force the Board to
determine if particular conduct is subject to the Act, the evil that the
Garmon rule was designed to avert, the fragmentation of the national
labor policy by the states, will proliferate, since the various state
tribunals will, under the "actually subject to" test, accept jurisdiction
more frequently than under the Garmon test.
III. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Union Communication with Employees:
"Names and Addresses" Rule
During the Survey year the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co.' approved the Board's Excelsior' rule, which provided
6 397 U.S. at 195.
7 359 U.S. at 244.
1 394 U.S. 759 (1969). For a discussion of the lower court decision see 1968-1969 An-
nual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785, 804-07 (1969).
2 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
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that in a representation election an employer must furnish a list of
the names and addresses of his employees to those unions seeking
recognition. Under the Excelsior rule, if an employer refuses to fur-
nish the union with the names and addresses of his employees, the
Board may set aside a representation election. 3
 Immediately after its
promulgation there was some concern that the rule might be invalid,
either because it violated the employees' rights to refrain from con-
certed activity,' or because it infringed on the employees' right to
privacy.5
 These doubts were finally put to rest in W yman-Gordon.°
More importantly, however, the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that because the Excelsior rule may have been promulgated in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),7 the Board
order in Wyman-Gordon based on the Excelsior rule was improper.
The First Circuit had determined that the Board, in promulgating its
Excelsior rule had violated those provisions of the APA which regulate
the quasi-legislative rule-making power of federal agencies!' The court
of appeals conceded that the Board had a right to promulgate a rule
in an adjudicative proceeding where the result of the case "stands as
a guide for the future and may be spoken of as a rule.'" The court
ruled, however, that the Excelsior rule, because it was prospective
only," was not properly formulated in an adjudicative proceeding, and
was, therefore, subject to the provisions of the APA. Because the
Board did not comply with all requirements of the APA in announcing
its Excelsior decision, the court of appeals found that the Excelsior
rule was invalid as having been improperly promulgated. The Su-
preme Court agreed with this reasoning, and found that although
the Board certainly had the power to decide the issue in an adjudica-
tory hearing, the Board in Excelsior had purported to make a rule,
which was an exercise of its quasi-legislative power.' Nevertheless,
the First Circuit was reversed. The invalidity of the Excelsior rule
3
 Id. 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
4 See NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div.-Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188, 66 L.R.R.M.
2264 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968) ; NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52,
66 L.R.R.M. 2481 (7th Cir. 1967).
5 NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div.-Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188, 66 L.R.R.M. 2264 (4th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 409 F.2d 1207, 69 L.R.R.M. 2756 (W.D.N.C.
1968).
6 394 U.S. at 769.
7 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (Supp. III, 1965).
8 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1965) provides for publishing rules in the Federal
Register. Section 553 provides for publication in the Federal Register of proposed rules,
and requires that "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rule-making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. III, 1965).
9 Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394, 397, 68 L.R.R.M. 2483, 2485
(1st Cir. 1968).
to The Excelsior rule did not take effect until 30 days after the decision and did
not apply to the parties in the case. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61
L.R.R.M. 1217, 1218 n,5 (1966).
11 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
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notwithstanding, the Board's decision in Wyman-Gordon to order the
employer to furnish the union with names and addresses was itself
a valid exercise of the Board's adjudicatory powers." As a result,
although defective at the outset because of failure to comply with the
APA, the so-called Excelsior rule has been given new life. Since in
Wyman-Gordon it was not developed for prospective application only,
but rather was properly promulgated as a decision in a proper ad-
judicatory procedure, it has the same precedential value as any other
Board decision.
Having held that the rule in Excelsior was improperly promul-
gated, but that the Board's order in Wyman-Gordon was a proper
exercise of its adjudicatory powers, the Supreme Court next decided
that a federal district court had jurisdiction under the National Labor
Relations Act" to enforce a Board order to furnish the names and
addresses of employees?' The employer had argued that under the
NLRA a federal district court can only enforce subpoenas for evi-
dence needed in an investigation. The employer did not argue that
a representation election is not an investigation within the meaning of
the Act, but argued that the names and addresses of employees were
not "evidence" within the meaning of the Act. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that "in the
context of § 11 of the Act, 'evidence' means not only proof at a hear-
ing but also books and records and other papers which will be of
assistance to the Board in conducting a particular investigation.'" 5
As such, the names and addresses of employees do constitute proper
subject matter for an enforcement order of a federal district court, and
therefore an enforcement order will issue from a federal district court
where the employer has refused to comply with a Board order to
supply such names and addresses.
Later in the Survey year, the Board disposed of an employer's
contention that a union "need" for names and addresses must be
proven in each case before an order to furnish the list is made." In
Murphy Bonded Warehouse, Inc., ' 1
 the employer refused to furnish
the list required under Excelsior because the union already possessed
much of the information which the list would provide. The employer
argued that the Wyman-Gordon decision required the Hearing Officer
to decide whether the union, in fact, had a need for the list." The
12 Id. at 766.
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 161(1)-(2) (1964).
14 394 U.S. at 768.
15 Id., quoting the district court opinion. The Court also cited NLRB v. Q-T Shoe
Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247, 70 L.R.R.M. 3267 (3rd Cir. 1969), which decided the question
in the same way.
10 Murphy Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 72 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1969).
17 Id .
18 Presumably this argument was based on the Wyman-Gordon Court's rejection
of the prospective application of the Excelsior rule as promulgated in Excelsior. However,
the Wyman-Gordon promulgation of the rule was proper and, therefore, could be
applied prospectively as could any adjudicative ruling.
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Board tacitly assumed that Wyman-Gordon did in fact so require, but
then declared that all unions as a practical matter have a "need" for
Excelsior lists prior to representation elections."
The Board stated that even if the union had all of the names
and addresses on the lists there would still be a need for supplying
them. The Board gave three reasons supporting its decision:
(1) To allow the employer to elicit testimony which might prove
that the union already bad this information might well result in the
divulging of the number and identity of authorization card signers;
(2) The Excelsior list would be required in order to insure the
accuracy of the union information;
(3) To allow an investigation into union need would hamper "the
speedy resolution of questions of representation" and thereby frustrate
congressional intent.2°
It would appear, then, that if the reasoning in Murphy is fol-
lowed, employer requests for a determination of union "need" will
not be successful in the future.
The decision in Wyman-Gordon has resolved any uncertainty
which lingered as to the substantive validity of the Excelsior rule, or
as to the jurisdiction of a federal district court to enforce Excelsior
orders. No doubt more indirect attacks on it, such as the one defeated
in Murphy, will be made in the future, but the rule appears to have
weathered its severest test. The question which now remains is whether
the rule will prove a sufficient alternative to providing union or-
ganizers with "equal time" on company premises in order to speak
to the captive audience now available only to the employer during an
organizational campaign. It is clear that the Board, in promulgating
Excelsior wished to avoid this more stringent rule, which would con-
travene the long standing Board policy which seeks to avoid rules
which would require employers to permit union organizers on their
plants and on their premises. Because of the importance of main-
taining that policy, it is hoped that the Excelsior rule will prove a
sufficient countermeasure to the clear advantage now enjoyed by man-
agement.
B. Recognition Without Election
When a union is seeking to establish a bargaining obligation it
must demonstrate that it represents a majority of an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. Usually the union will obtain recognition of its status
through a Board held election under Section 9(c) of the Act. This
method of establishing recognition is preferred for several reasons.'
19 The Board also found that, because the union only had partial lists, it clearly
needed the information necessary under the Excelsior rule, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 72
L.R.R.M. at 1610.
20 Id,
' See Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
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It has long been held, however, that a union which can otherwise
demonstrate its majority status should be recognized by an employer.'
Statutory authority for this position is found in Section 8(a) (5) 3 of
the Act, which prohibits an employer from refusing to bargain col-
lectively with "the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." Section 9(a) provides that for collective
bargaining purposes the exclusive representative of employees shall
be that representative designated or selected for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in the appropriate
unit.' Since it is nowhere suggested in the Act that a Board election is
the only route to enforceable majority status, alternative means for
demonstrating majority support are accepted and enforced by the
Board.
The most common of these alternatives involves the use of au-
thorization cards. A labor organization often will campaign for recog-
nition by circulating authorization cards among the employees in an
appropriate unit. If the union does not obtain a majority, but does
obtain the signatures of at least 30% of the employees, the Board will
entertain a petition for a representation election.' But if a majority
of the employees sign the cards authorizing the labor organization to
represent them, the union may demand recognition from the employer
and present the cards as evidence of majority support. in the past
the employer could refuse to bargain only if he entertained a "good
faith doubt" concerning the validity of the authorization cards, in
which case either the union or the employer could petition the Board
for a representation election.
Recently this procedure has come under criticism.' Some courts
have questioned the legality of any alternative to a Board election; '
other decisions have criticized the Board rules which did not consider
the subjective intent of employees when signing the cards, but rather
looked only to the cards themselves. 8
 During the Survey year many
of these problems were dealt with by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
2
 In NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 6 L.R.R.M. 746 (2d Cir.
1940), the court articulated what has remained the general test that recognition should
come when a union has presented "convincing evidence of majority support."
3
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
4
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
5 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1970).
0
 For a more complete discussion of the developments in 1968-1969, see 1968-1969
Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785, 808-15
(1969).
7
 See Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367, 66 L.R.R.M. 2529 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d
562, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967). In these cases the Court of Appeals of the
Fourth Circuit held that the Taft-Hartley Act, by permitting the resolution of repre-
sentation disputes only by secret ballot under § 9(c), had withdrawn from the Board
of authority to order an employer to bargain for a violation of § 8(a) (5) where no
secret ballot had been taken.
8
 See Schwarzenbach-Huber Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 236, 70 L.R.R.M. 2805 (2d Cir.
1969).
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Gissel Packing Co.' In Gissel four cases, which had been decided
separately at the circuit level, were consolidated for decision. Of these,
three had been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and one by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Each of the four cases exhibited essentially the same fact pattern.
As a result of an organizational campaign the union obtained authori-
zation cards from a majority of employees, and subsequently de-
manded recognition by the employer offering the cards as proof of
the union's majority status. The employer then refused to bargain
with the union on the ground that the authorization cards were in-
herently unreliable. At the same time the employer began an anti-
union campaign which gave rise to union charges of unfair labor
practices." In only two of the four cases did the union petition for a
Board election." Those elections resulted in defeat for the union, but
the union subsequently filed unfair labor practice charges under sec-
tion 8(a) (5). The other two unions did not seek a Board election, but
sought immediate recognition under the Board's section 8(a) (5)
power, claiming that a fair election had been rendered impossible by
the employer's conduct.
In each of the four cases the Board found a refusal to bargain
under section 8(a) (5) and ordered the employer to bargain. The
Board based its decision on findings that the authorization cards were
valid, that a majority of them had been obtained from the employees
of appropriate bargaining units, and that the refusal by the employers
to bargain, based on a stated objection to the "inherent reliability" of
authorization cards in general, did not constitute a "good faith" doubt
of the union's majority status." In reaching this last conclusion the
Board considered the employers commission of unfair labor practice
which undermined the union majority to be determinative. The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the Board decision but the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on previous
decisions'" rejected the Board's finding of a refusal to bargain in
separate per curiam opinions. In overruling the decisions of the Fourth
Circuit and affirming the decisions of the First the Supreme Court held
that a duty to bargain could arise under the Act when there bad been
no Board election, and that union authorization cards, if obtained
without representation or coercion, are sufficiently reliable to provide
an alternative to a Board election. Finally the Court ruled that a
bargaining order is the proper remedy when an employer refuses to
bargain while at the same time committing unfair labor practices
9 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
10 In each of the cases, unfair labor practice charges were filed for violations of
§ 8(a)(5) (refusal to bargain), § 8(a)(1) (coercion and intimidation) and § 8(a)
(3) (discharge of union adherent).
11 395 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1969).
12 Id.
13 See note 7 supra.
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which undermine the union's majority status and tend to make a fair
election impossible."
The section 8(a) (5) bargaining order procedure upheld in Gissel
had been rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Logan Packing Co." The
Court in Logan held that the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947,
which required secret elections under Section 9 of the Act, operated
to withdraw any Board power to issue a bargaining order based on
authorization cards. The lack of secrecy in obtaining authorization
cards, coupled with a lack of "laboratory conditions," both of which
were required by the Amendments, made the procedure of recognition
based only on authorization cards suspect to the Court. This, together
with absence of congressional endorsement of the use of authorization
cards as an alternative to an election, was viewed as a repudiation of
the technique.
The Court rejected this line of reasoning in Gissel, pointing out
that the ruling of the Fourth Circuit was in direct opposition to the
line of cases which culminated in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas
Oak Flooring Co.," which was decided nine years after the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments. In United Mine Workers,
the Court stated that an employer has an obligation to recognize a
union which has been selected by a majority of employees signing
authorization cards, reasoning that section 9(a) "which deals ex-
pressly with employee representation, says nothing as to how the
employees' representative shall be chosen. 7"7
 Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the majority in Gissel, found no reason to reject the United
Mine Workers logic. He criticized the Logan court's reliance on the
failure of Congress to include an endorsement of the authorization
card technique:
Indeed, the 1947 amendments weaken rather than
strengthen the position taken by . . . the Fourth Circuit be-
low. An early version of the bill in the House would have
amended § 8(5) of the Wagner Act to permit the Board to
find a refusal to bargain with a union "currently recognized
by the employer or certified as such [through an election]
under section 9" ... The proposed change, which would have
eliminated the use of cards, was rejected in conference • . . ,
however, and we cannot make a similar change in the Act
simply because, . . . Congress did not expressly approve the
use of cards in rejecting the House amendment's
Finally, section 9(c) speaks of the requirement for an election
only in the context of Board certification. The Court found that the
14
 395 U.S. 575, 610-16 (1969).
18
 386 F.2d 562, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967).
16 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
. 17 Id. at 71.
18
 395 U.S. 575, 598 (1969).
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"special privileges" accorded a union after Board certification" were
sufficient to distinguish recognition given after certification from
recognition given voluntarily or as the result of a bargaining order.
Section 9(c), in requiring a secret ballot election, only sought to pro-
tect the certification process, and was not intended to affect other
procedures for obtaining recognition.
This distinction, by itself, is not a persuasive answer to the
Fourth Circuit's contention in Logan that Congress actually intended
to restrict an employers duty to bargain under section 8(a) (5) to
situations in which a union had been certified. When this distinction
is combined with the Court's analysis of the legislative history of sec-
tion 9(c), however, there can be little doubt that the Congress had
no intention of interfering with alternative means for achieving recog-
nition. In upholding United Mine Workers and rejecting the reasoning
of Logan, therefore, the Court appears to have put to rest whatever
question remained as to the power of the Board to issue a bargaining
order based solely on authorization cards. Prior to the decision in
Gissel, in cases when an employer refused to bargain after being pre-
sented with authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees
in an appropriate bargaining unit, the Board would find a violation of
section 8(a) (5) unless the employer entertained a good faith
doubt as to the union's majority status. Originally this policy, known
as the "Joy Silk Doctrine," required the employer to demonstrate that
he did, in fact, entertain a good faith doubt." The Board, in deter-
mining the existence of a good faith doubt, could find that unfair
labor practices committed by the employer for the purpose of dis-
sipating the union majority were evidence of the employer's bad faith.
In 1965 the Board altered its policy, shifting the burden of show-
ing bad faith to the General Counsel?' As a result the employer was
as a practical matter no longer forced to accept authorization cards in
lieu of an election. The Board found bad faith only in situations where
the employer had committed unfair labor practices which tended to
dissipate the union's majority, or where particular employer conduct
indicated bad faith. This policy was changed further when on oral
argument in Gissel the Board announced that an employer's good
faith would no longer be considered important in determining whether
19 For example, "protection against the filing of new election petitions by rival
unions or employees seeking decertification for 12 months (§ 9(c) (3)), protection for
a reasonable period, usually one year, against any disruption of the bargaining relation-
ship because of claims that the union no longer represents a majority (see Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1964)), protection against recognitional picketing by rival unions
(§ 8(b) (4)(C)), and freedom from the restrictions placed on work assignments disputes
by § 8(b)(4)(D), and on recognitional and organizational picketing by § 8(b)(7)."
395 U.S. 575 at 599.
20
 See Joy Silk Mills, Inc. 85 N.L.R.B. No. 211, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1949), enforced,
185 F.2d 732, 27 L.R.R.M. 2012 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
	 •
21 John P. Serpa, Inc. 155 N.L.R.B. 99, 60 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1965). See also Aaron
Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
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a bargaining order would issue based on authorization cards." Instead
the Board stated that it will look to whether serious unfair labor prac-
tices have occurred which tend to preclude the holding of a fair elec-
tion." If the Board determines that no unfair practices of a serious
nature have been committed by the employer, it will not issue a bar-
gaining order based solely on a showing of a lack of good faith.
Of course an employer cannot refuse to bargain if he knows that
the union does, in fact, hold a majority, but he no longer need concern
himself with authorization cards, if he prefers to wait for the results
of a Board election before he recognizes the union. On the other hand,
under the new policy, the union is protected in the event the employer
commits unfair labor practices which tend to undermine his majority
status. In this latter instance the authorization cards are viewed
by the Board as an adequate substitute for an election because a fair
election has become an impossibility due to the employer's illegal under-
mining tactics.
Though the change in the Board's policy does reflect a diminished
faith in the reliability of authorization cards, its continued willing-
ness to issue a bargaining order based on cards alone rests on the
underlying assumption that the cards are sufficiently reliable evidence
of employer wishes. In Gissel, however, authorization cards were at-
tacked as being inherently unreliable because of the lack of secrecy
and the potential for union misrepresentation and coercion. The Gissel
Court, while recognizing the infirmities of the cards," ruled in favor
of the use of authorization cards, but limited its ruling to situations
where under the Board's new procedure," the possibility of holding
a fair election has been seriously damaged by employer unfair labor
practices." In answer to the argument that authorization cards, as
contrasted to the election procedure, are unreliable, the Court observed
that the cards, while less reliable than elections, do provide some
guidance as to employee wishes. If employer conduct has, through un-
fair labor practices which undermine union support, rendered the
election process itself an unreliable method of determining majority
opinion, the cards, though far from perfect," may be the only way
to resolve a representation question.
22 395 U.S. 575 at 609-10.
23 Id.
24 The Fourth Circuit argument was persuasively set out in NLRB v. S.S. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967): "Unions which pre-
sented authorization cards from thirty to fifty percent of the employees won nineteen
percent of the elections; those having authorization cards from fifty to seventy percent
of the employees won only forty-eight percent of the elections, while those having
authorization cards from over seventy percent of the employees won seventy-four
percent of the elections." Id. at 565.
25 See text supra at 933.
25 395 U.S. 575 at 601.
27 Two arguments were advanced to show the unreliability of the cards when
compared to elections; (1) the employer may not have had a chance to express his
views, and (2) the employees' choice may have been due to group pressures. The Court
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Even if an employer has undermined union support he may still
object to a section 8(a)(5) bargaining order based on authorization
cards if he can show that the cards were obtained through misrep-
resentation or coercion. 28 The Court rejected the claim that the poten-
tial for misrepresentation rendered the cards inherently unreliable, and
upheld the Board's rule for controlling solicitation as set out in Cum-
berland Shoe Corp.' In Cumberland Shoe the Board ruled that au-
thorization cards will be valid where they are clear on their face and
where the union representative has not given assurances that they will
be used only for obtaining an election. The Supreme Court examined
this rule in General Steel, one of the cases consolidated in Gissel.
In General Steel, the union solicited signatures on authorization
cards which unambiguously stated that they would be used to obtain
recognition. During the solicitation campaign, however, the union
organizers told the signing employees that the cards would be kept
secret and shown only to the Board to obtain an election." Tinder the
Cumberland Shoe doctrine, if a card states on its face that it is to be
used for obtaining recognition, and not for an election, it will be in-
validated when the employer can show that the signing employee was
told that the card would only be used for election purposes. Thus, where
as in the General Steel situation, the possibility of using the cards
for representation was not wholly discounted by the union official, the
employee was assumed to have authorized both an election and imme-
diate recognition.
The Supreme Court, in overruling the court of appeals, agreed
with this application of Cumberland Shoe by the trial examiner but
warned that General Steel "represent[s] the limits of the Cumber-
land rule's application."' The Court did not define these limits more
exactly, but did adopt the Board's explanation of Cumberland set forth
in Levi Strauss & Co.32 In Levi Strauss the Board held that in deter-
mining whether a union has told an employee that a card will be used
solely for an election, it is not necessary to find in haec verba that the
employee has been so told. Rather it is sufficient to show that under
the totality of the circumstances the card signer had been assured that
his card would be used for an election only."
In the final analysis, the Gissel decision must be read in light of
what it did not decide, as well as what it did. The Court relied heavily
answered these arguments by saying that (I) a union will normally inform the employer
of its organizational campaign early in an organizational drive in order to subject him
to the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act, and (2) that group pressures are
often the cause of employee votes in an election, especially where the elections take
place in a small shop. 395 U.S. at 602-03.
38 Id. at 2493.
29 144 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963).
30 395 U.S. at 584.
31 Id. at 608.
32
 178 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968).
33 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1341 n.7.
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upon the fact that the Board had adopted a new procedure in which
an employer could always obtain a representation election as long as
he refrained from unfair labor practices which seriously undermined
union strength, and thereby rendered a fair election unlikely. In this
way the ultimate arbiter of whether there shall be an election is the
employer himself, and, clearly, he should not be heard to object to
the use of cards when he has created the situation which necessitates
their use.
The new procedure, it appears, puts to rest the "good faith" test
formerly used by the Board, and answers to a great extent those
critics who charged that authorization cards were too much a pro-
union device.' It should be noted that the Board's apparent altera-
tion of its procedures does not substantially change the long standing
practice of the Board, followed since Frank Brothers Co. v. NLRB,35
that a bargaining order would not issue unless a fair election had been
rendered impossible because of employer unfair labor practices.
Finally, the Court's approval of the Cumberland Shoe rule is
specifically limited to cards which unambiguously authorize only
immediate recognition." A decision on the so called "dual purpose"
cards was postponed, with an intimation that Cumberland Shoe must
be altered to accommodate more investigation into the subjective
intent of employees who sign dual purpose cards. Unambiguous cards,
moreover, must be subjected to an objective test, in which the totality
of the objective evidence must be weighed in order to determine
whether the employees were led to believe that the cards were going
to be used solely to obtain an election. In the end this test recognizes
the unreliability of employee testimony given months after an or-
ganizational campaign, and confirms the Board's contention that
employees have enough sophistication to understand the meaning of
unambiguous authorization cards. The Court's approval of the trial
examiner's finding in General Steel would seem to be contrary to the
position that a less mechanical application of Cumberland Shoe was
desirable. However, in holding that General Steel represents the outer
limits of Cumberland, the Court gives warning that in the future
determinations based on the totality of the circumstances will be re-
quired before full compliance will be found.
C. Election—Laboratory Conditions
In General Shoe Corp.,' the Board laid down its laboratory con-
ditions rule which is to be used in judging the validity of union elec-
tions: "Mt is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted under conditions as nearly ideal as
34 See the opinion of Medina, J. in Schwarzenbach-Huber Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d
236, 249, 70 L.R.R.M. 2805, 2815 (2d Cir. 1969).
35
 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
3e The Court took pains to point this out. 395 U.S. at 609.
1
 77 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
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possible to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." 2 Dur-
ing the Survey year, the application of the "laboratory conditions"
rule was clarified by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB. 3
The Board, in Home Town Foods,' though it found that employer
charges of election irregularities, including threats by union organizers
on the lives of two employees and sabotage of an employee's truck,
were valid, nevertheless decided to certify the union's election victory.
The Board found that although the individual incidents exceeded per-
missible bounds, only a limited number of employees were aware of
the incidents and, therefore, the entire election had not been tainted.
On appeal by the employer, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the Board, pointing to the requirement for "laboratory
conditions" in general, and to the Board's reliance on what the court
called "the objective (or inferential) conduct impact appraisal
method."' Under this method, which substantially ignores testimony
on subjective elements in favor of the evidence presented by the objec-
tive incident, it is not necessary to actually demonstrate that so much
of the electorate has been directly involved in election irregularities
that the entire election is tainted. Rather, it is sufficient to show that
there has been some impermissible election misconduct. The Board
then may infer, if it is reasonable to do so, that the "laboratory condi-
tions" were not present.' A finding, therefore, that only a single em-
ployee was directly threatened, or that only a few employees witnessed
the incident, may give rise to the inference that the word was circu-
lated sufficiently so that employees no longer felt able to exercise a free
and uncoerced choice. The court in Home Town Foods found that such
an inference was inescapable, and ordered that the election be held
over again. In so doing, the court refused to apply the more subjective
test applied by the Board in House Town Foods, and held that when
impermissible conduct is found, an objective determination must be
made of whether that conduct, if circulated, would destroy the re-
quired "laboratory conditions."
It is submitted that the result reached by the circuit court is
proper. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 7 the Supreme Court stated:
We . . . accept the observation that employees are more
likely than not, many months after a card drive and in
response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony
damaging to the union, particularly where company officials
2 Id. at 1341.
8 416 F.2d 392, 71 L.R.R.M. 2663 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 172 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 68 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1968).
5 416 F.2d at 399, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2667.
Id,
7 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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have previously threatened reprisals for union activity in
violation of § 8 (a) (1) .8
What is true of employee testimony taken after authorization cards
have been challenged, is also likely to be true of employee testimony
taken after an election. And this is especially true where the union
or the employer has made serious threats of reprisal. If the rationale
of Gissel applies equally here, the difficulty in obtaining sufficient
testimony to satisfy the Board's more subjective test is obviated, and
with that in mind, it would appear that the objective analysis of the
nature of the incident required by the court in Home Town Foods is
preferable.
D. Appropriate Bargaining Unit: State-Wide Units
Before a representation election may be validly certified, the Board
must determine whether an appropriate employee unit has been chosen
for the purpose of collective bargaining.' The impact of this decision
on election results is often substantial. Employers may seek large units
which are difficult to organize, or may, if union strength is concentrated
heavily in one area, seek to limit the bargaining unit to that area alone.
Similarly, unions will seek small units when they cannot organize
enough support to win in a large unit, and large units when they are
sufficiently organized, or when local concentrations of strength are so
great that they will offset the anti-union vote in less organized loca-
tions. In determining whether a particular bargaining unit is appro-
priate, the Board is provided with little guidance by the Act. Sec-
tion 9(b) directs the Board to "assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter . .. while
section 9(c) (5) directs that "the extent to which the employees have
organized shall not be controlling." 3
 These necessarily vague stan-
dards recognize the difficulties inherent in determining the appropriate
unit, and constitute a congressional delegation to the Board of "a large
measure of informed discretion," which is "rarely to be disturbed."'
The Board in exercising its discretion has interpreted the man-
date of section 9, that it select "the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining,' to mean only that some appropriate unit be
determined, not that the most appropriate or the ultimate unit° should
be selected. Armed with this interpretation, the Board has approved
units consisting of single administrative divisions' as well as multiple
8 Id. at 608.
1 29 U.S.C. § 159(6) (1964).
2 Id.
3
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1964).
4 Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1946).
5 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
6 Morand Bros. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950).
T Koppers Stores, 73 N.L.R.B. 504, 20 L.R.R.M. 1003 (1947); Say-On Drugs, Inc.,
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administrative divisions which operate in one geographic area,' and
the courts have for the most part refrained from interfering.
During the Survey year, however, a Board approval of a State-
wide bargaining unit was overturned by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. In Retail Clerks v. NLRB,9 the employer, Adams
Drug Co., refused to bargain following a union victory in a Board-held
representation election. The employer based its refusal on a conten-
tion that the election had been held for a unit inappropriate for collec-
tive bargaining purposes. On review, the Board conceded that the
state-wide unit was not based on any administrative subdivision of
the Adams Drug Co.,' but found that a unit consisting of all retail
drug stores in the State of Rhode Island was appropriate because the
employees in Rhode Island shared a "special community of interest
apart from the others by reason of the State's regulation of the retail
drug industry."" In this way, the Board justified the state-wide bar-
gaining unit as a geographic area unit.
The court of appeals reversed. While it recognized the broad dis-
cretion granted to the Board under the Act, the court determined that
the Board's justification for approving the unit was "patently sophis-
tic." Congress and the courts have made it clear that reversal of a
Board determination is proper when the Board has articulated no
substantial reason for its decision, or has acted in a way so inconsistent
with its own prior decisions as to suggest arbitrariness.' In Retail
Clerks, the Board's contention that state-wide regulation of the drug
industry was sufficient to support a community of interests was rejected
because pharmacists, the only regulated employees, had been specifi-
cally excluded from the unit, and the states abutting Rhode Island,
Massachusetts and Connecticut, also regulate pharmacists in much
the same way as Rhode Island. For the latter reason, the court could
find no rationale for excluding Massachusetts and Connecticut stores
from the unit, and, for both reasons the court could find no rational
explanation for the Board's determination. Finally, the court found
that no Board decisions in the past supported the finding that a state-
wide unit was appropriate solely because the employees were regulated
138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962); 'Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No.
111, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1968).
8 Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 998, 28 L,R.R.M. 1622 (1951).
414 F.2d 1194, 71 L.R.R.M. 2721 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
10 The Adams Drug Co. consisted of 83 drug stores, most of which were located
in New England and New York. Twenty-five of these were located in Rhode Island,
and came under the New England operating divisions. All but one of the Rhode Island
stores were located in the metropolitan Providence area, while one store, situated in
Massachusetts, was itself located in metropolitan Providence. Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 2721-22.
11 Adams Drug Co., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 65 L.R.R.M. 1124-25 (1967).
12 NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc., 376 F.2d 497, 501, 65 L.R.R.M. 2261, 2264
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967) (lack of substantial reason); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906, 55 L.R.R.M. 2444 (1st Cir. 1964) (incon-
sistent decisions).
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on a state-wide basis.' The court, therefore, found that the Board
had abused its discretion under Section 9(1)(c) of the LMRA.
It would appear that the court decided correctly. Of course, it is
always difficult for a court to challenge the expertise of the Board when
the question is the appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.
However, when so thin a justification as this is given, the court must
react, because the determination of the appropriate unit has great effect
on the outcome of elections. It is also important because it determines
which employees will be in the unit, and it is undesirable to include
persons in a collective bargaining unit who do not desire to be repre-
sented. Thus, the Board should refrain from approving units which
include such persons when the reason for doing so is as insubstantial
as the one in Retail Clerks.
E. Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Employee Eligibility—
Social Security Annuitants
The Board has been allowed considerable discretion in determin-
ing whether an individual employee should be included in a particular
bargaining unit.' It has traditionally found regular part-time employees
eligible for inclusion in bargaining units.' Until recently, however,
part-time employees who were Social Security annuitants and who
sought to reduce hours and earnings in order to receive full Social
Security benefits had been denied inclusion. This exception to the
general rule was first articulated in Taunton Supply Corp.,' where the
Board reasoned that a Social Security annuitant did not have a suffi-
cient "community of interest" with other employees to be considered
as a member of the collective bargaining unit. The underlying assump-
tion in Taunton Supply was that Social Security annuitants who limit
their hours and earnings in order to remain eligible for full Social
Security benefits would not share the same bargaining goals with other
employees.' The validity
 of this assumption was successfully challenged
13
 The court rejected the precedential value of those cases authorizing state-wide
units of insurance agents such as Allstate Ins. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 885, 40 L.R.R.M. 1266
(1957). In Allstate, the Board considered the licensing laws of the State of Ohio as one
of the factors in determining whether only insurance agents, as opposed to other
employees in the insurance industry, should be included in the state-wide unit. Of
course, in Retail Clerks, the employees in the unit were not licensed or otherwise
controlled by the state. The court thought the analogy to the insurance cases to be
irrational. In addition, the Board decision in Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B.
960, 49 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1961), reversed the Board policy which preferred state-wide
units in insurance cases so that the Board now approves appropriate units for insurance
cases in the same way as for any other industry. The court concluded from this that
the Board's reliance on insurance cases to demonstrate the harmony of prior Board
rulings with the Board's decision in Retail Clerks tended to prove the employer's case.
414 F.2d 1194, 1196, 71 L.R.R.M. 2721, 2728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
1 See Indianapolis Clove Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 363, 69 L.R.R.M. 2261 (6th Cir.
1968).
2 Id. at 367, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2263.
a 137 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 50 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1962).
4 This view of the exception first made in Taunton Supply was articulated by the
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in Indianapolis Glove Co. v. NLRB,6 where the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Board's speculation on employees'
bargaining goals was unreasonable and arbitrary because it was not
based on the Board's traditional objective standards. The court ob-
served that the factors relied upon by the Board to show a lack of
community interest were totally unreasonable and arbitrary.' The
court further concluded that the Board could not declare that particular
employees are ineligible for inclusion in a particular bargaining unit
simply because they sought to fully enjoy their rights under the Social
Security Act. Accordingly, the court found that the Board had abused
its discretion and the case was remanded.
During the Survey year, the Board in Holiday Inns of America,
Inc. 7 acceded to the International Glove rationale and overruled Taun-
ton Supply. In the future, then, annuitants will not be excluded simply
because they limit their hours and earnings in order to receive full
Social Security benefits. What is more interesting, and what the Board
did not discuss, is whether other tests for eligibility which appear to
be objective but which are based upon an assumption that bargaining
goals are different may also be incorrect.
Although other Board classifications are not based wholly on the
bargaining goals of the employees, it is probably true that a determin-
ing factor in borderline situations is the probable bargaining goals of
persons filling the position under consideration. Thus, a Board deci-
sion to classify those filling certain positions as supervisors is surely
often based in part on the assumption that the worker in that position
has a different, more management oriented perspective, and that he will
presumptively have different bargaining goals. It is submitted that the
sub silentio consideration of bargaining goals is not wholly inappro-
priate. It is further submitted that the rationale now adopted in Holiday
Inns, while correct in requiring the presence of some objective factors,
should not be used in the future to question the consideration of bar-
gaining goals in making a determination of eligibility when other,
more objective, standards are not by themselves determinative.
IV. ARBITRATION
A. Agreements to Arbitrate and Concurrent NLRB Jurisdiction
The 1969 Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Strong' gave rise
once again to a dispute over the effects of Board jurisdiction on the
General Counsel in Indianapolis Glove Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 363, 69 L.R.R.M. 2261
(6th Cir. 1968), when he argued that annuitants would have less motivation to ask for
higher wages than workers with "growing families."
5 Id.
6 "The tests used by the Board are whether the part-time employees work at
regularly assigned hours a substantial number of hours each week, perform duties
similar to those of full-time employees, and share the same supervision, working condi-
tions, wages and fringe benefits." Id. at 367, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2263.
7 176 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 71 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1969).
1 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
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national policy favoring arbitration which was created by Section 301
of the Act.' In Strong the Supreme Court upheld a remedial order of
the Board which in effect required specific performance of a collective
bargaining agreement. The case arose when Strong, a member of a
multi-employer bargaining association, withdrew from the association
after it had concluded a bargaining agreement with the union. The col-
lective bargaining agreement included a provision for grievance arbi-
tration. Strong's employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the Board under sections 8(a) (5) and M.' After finding for the
employees, the Board ordered Strong to sign the collective bargain-
ing agreement and to pay to the employees "any fringe benefits pro-
vided for in [the] agreement.'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce
that part of the Board order which required payment of fringe benefits,
on the ground that such an order amounted to an order for specific
performance of the contract. The court of appeals reasoned that
contract interpretation was the exclusive province of the courts and
that a Board award which amounted to specific performance of the
contract was, therefore, beyond the power of the Board.5
 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari' to determine whether the Board's powers
under Section 10(c) of the LMRA 7 included the power to award
benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement as a remedy
for an unfair labor practice. Under section 10(c) the Board
shall issue and cause to be served . . . an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor prac-
tice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this . . . [Act]. [Emphasis added.] 8
In reversing the court of appeals, the Court held that the retro-
active payment of fringe benefits was "such affirmative action" as
would effectuate the policies of the Act and was, therefore, within the
power of the Board. Justice White, writing for the majority, recog-
nized that the Board did not have plenary authority to interpret and
enforce collective bargaining agreements. However, since the funda-
mental policy of a remedial order under the Act is to make the worker
whole,' and since section 10(c) makes clear reference to awards for
back pay, the Act implicitly calls for the Board's interpretation of
the contract. For these reasons Justice White concluded that the
2 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3
 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (1) (1964).
4 Joseph T. Strong, 152 N.L.R.B. 9, 14, 59 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1005 (1965).
5
 NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929, 65 L.R.R.M. 3012 (9th Cir. 1967).
6 391 U.S. 933 (1968).
7 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
8 Id.
9
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)
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Board's award of the fringe benefits provided in the agreement was
proper.
Justice Douglas, the principle author of the Court's policy on
arbitration, dissented. He argued that the national policy favoring
arbitration as a means for settling labor disputes was being repudi-
ated by the majority because the expertise and experience of the
professional arbiter would be lost if the Board were permitted to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement in fashioning a remedy.
It was Justice Douglas' position that the Board order to sign the
agreement was sufficient since the parties could then proceed to arbi-
tration on the question of fringe benefits under the agreement. The
Court's decision to enforce the award of the Board, in Justice Douglas'
view, as a practical matter undermined the national policy in favor
of arbitration.
There can be little doubt that Justice Douglas has correctly
assessed the impact of Strong, but it seems equally certain that the
Board does in fact have the power under section 10(c) to interpret
and enforce a contract provision when it effectuates the policy of the
Act by making the worker whole.
In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB,1° a case decided after Strong,
the conflict between the arbitration process and the Board's jurisdiction
in unfair labor practice cases was again made apparent. Sixteen em-
ployees of Morrison-Knudsen had been discharged for listening to a
safety lecture delivered on company time by a union official who had
obtained the permission of the management. The union, in seeking
relief for its members, had two routes open to it. It could submit the
matter to arbitration under the grievance-arbitration procedures of
the collective bargaining agreement; or it could initiate an unfair labor
practice proceeding before the Board by charging the employer with
a violation of section 8(a) (1). The court of appeals enforced the order
of the Board.
The holding is clearly in compliance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 11
 where the Court rejected
the argument that Board jurisdiction had been pre-empted by Sec-
tion 301 of the Act,' 2 and stated:
The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor prac-
tice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is
not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not
destroy the jurisdiction of the Courts in suits under § 3012'
The difficulty, however, is that, under the rule in Smith, a party can
avoid his contract responsibility to arbitrate and thereby frustrate
the national policy in favor of arbitration. 14
to 418 F.2d 203, 72 L.R.R.M. 2460 (9th Cir. 1969).
11 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
12 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
13 371 U.S. at 197.
14 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United
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Thus, Morrison-Knudsen confirms the fears Justice Douglas raised
in his dissent in the Strong decision. Under the present law the Board
clearly has the authority to resolve situations where an unfair labor
practice has been committed even though the parties have agreed to
arbitrate those problems under a collective bargaining agreement.
Justice Douglas dissented in Strong, arguing that the Board did not
have the power to so interfere with an arbitration agreement. It would
appear that this position is incorrect. As pointed out by the majority,
the language of the Act is very broad, and clearly does not rule out
contract interpretation by the Board.
The question whether the Board should exercise its power in
cases where arbitration has been agreed on, is somewhat different. In
Morrison-Knudsen, Judge Powell concurred with the result but sug-
gested that the court should have remanded to the Board with an
instruction requiring arbitration. It is submitted that if Lincoln Mills
and the Steelworkers Trilogy properly defined the importance of favor-
ing arbitration as a tool for resolving labor disputes, the Board should
adopt a policy of ordering arbitration on those issues which demand
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
B. Multi-Party Arbitration
When two or more labor organizations represent different groups
of employees within a single plant, disputes over work assignments
often occur. Typically, work assignment disputes arise where a change
in technology has created new job classifications.' If the collective
bargaining agreement of the union to which a particular job was not
assigned includes a work protection clause which arguably grants to
the union the right to that particular job assignment, the union may
seek judicial enforcement of that clause under Section 301 of the Act.'
If the collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause
the union may seek relief by submitting the matter to arbitration. On
the other hand, if the dispute is concerned with which union should
represent the employees doing particular work, it is a representational
question which could be dealt with by the Board under Section 9 of
the Act.' If, however, the controversy is concerned merely with whether
certain work should be performed by the workers of one bargaining
unit rather than another, it can be remedied by the Board only after a
hearing under Section 10(k) 4
 of the Act. The difficulty with the latter
procedure was that the Board only had authority to resolve disputes
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
1
 See Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R.,
385 U.S. 157 (1966).
2 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
3
 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
4 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
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under section 10(k) after a union had committed an unfair labor
practice under section 8(b) (4) (ii) (D) 6 by threatening, coercing or
restraining the employer to assign particular work to employees of
the union.° In addition, of course, the union could charge the employer
with a refusal to bargain if the employer violated section 8(a) (5) by
refusing to bargain on the issue with the union. In effect, then, unless
a union could characterize the controversy as representational, or unless
the employer simply refused to bargain, the union would be forced to
strike to compel the employer to assign the disputed work to its
members in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board. Under sec-
tion 10(k) the Board could give effect to the collective bargaining
agreement and thereby resolve the questions.
Prior to 1964 it had been argued that in work assignment disputes
which involved both a breach of contract and a representational or
unfair labor practice question, the Board should have exclusive juris-
diction to resolve the dispute.'
In Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,' however, the Supreme
Court held that Board jurisdiction over work assignment disputes was
not exclusive.° It reasoned that the jurisdiction conferred on the federal
district courts by Section 301 of the Act was concurrent with the juris-
diction of the Board in work assignment disputes. After Carey it was
permissible, and even desirable, in these cases for a federal district
court to compel arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.
Underlying Carey was the conviction that the policy of the national
labor laws would best be served by promoting arbitration. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority in Carey, was clearly attempting
to advance arbitration as the preferred means of settling labor disputes.
He reasoned that if the dispute is merely over a work assignment,
arbitration avoids the necessity for a union strike to bring the
matter before the Board, and, that if it is a true representation
question, arbitration, even with one party, could have a curative effect.
Most importantly, however, he felt that by compelling arbitration in
these situations the special expertise of a knowledgeable arbitrator
would be brought to bear on the problem.
Nevertheless, the Court's policy in favor of arbitration is largely
6 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (1964).
8 As a practical matter, a dispute can reach the Board through two routes: by a
union strike when the issue is simply "a controversy as to whether certain work should
be performed by workers in one bargaining unit or those in another • • ," or by direct
petition where the issue is "which union should represent the employees doing particular
work." Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 263 (1964).
7 IBEW, Local 1505'v. Local 1836 IAM, 304 1F.2d 365, 50 L.R.R.M. 2337 (1st Cir.
1962); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 452, 184 N.E.2d 298, 230 N.Y.S.2d
703, 50 L.R.R.M. 2740 (Ct. App. 1962),
8 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
9 The Carey decision was the natural extension of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195 (1962), where the Court held that Board jurisdiction did not exclude
the jurisdiction of a federal district court in a suit for damages.
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frustrated by the peculiar nature of a work dispute case. The diffi-
culty stems from dicta in Carey itself which suggested that a Board
ruling in conflict with a prior section 301 order will take precedence
over the court decision, so as to give maximum effect to the national
labor policy as articulated by the Board, which policy was viewed
as having precedence over contractual arbitration. As a result, if a
Board order is handed down which is in direct conflict with a prior
arbitration award, the employer apparently would be relieved of any
liability stemming from the arbitration award.' To eliminate this
result, the Board in cases not involving work disputes normally will
avoid the conflict created by the existence of concurrent Board and
court jurisdiction by voluntarily refusing jurisdiction when court en-
forced arbitration has already taken place." The Board will not
refuse jurisdiction, however, if it clearly appears that the prior arbi-
tration is tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or serious procedural
irregularities.12
Typically, arbitration awards resolving work assignment disputes
do involve unfairness, since they are based on the testimony of only
one of the two or more competing unions. Consequently, the Board
probably will take jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice charge
arising out of a work assignment dispute. When the Board does not
choose to assert jurisdiction, the policy favoring arbitration as the
means for solving labor disputes will be thwarted, and the more sub-
stantial expertise of the trained professional arbitrator will be lost to all
parties." Multipartite arbitration in which the claims of all interested
parties are considered would solve these difficulties.
During the Survey year, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n." the solution offered
by multipartite arbitration was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. The dispute in CBS arose over the assignment of work to
members of the Radio and Television Broadcast Engineers Union
(Engineers Union). This work had previously been performed by
members of the American Recording and Broadcasting Association
(Recording Association). The Recording Association membership,
composed mostly of recording engineers, had broken away from the
Engineers Union and had been certified by the Board. Shortly after
each of the unions had concluded collective bargaining agreements
with CBS, certain work previously assigned to Recording Association
personnel was assigned to members of the Engineers Union. Both col-
10 375 U.S. at 272. See also Dock Loaders v. Richeson & Sons, Inc., 280 F. Supp.
402, 67 L.R.R.M. 2560 (E.D. La. 1958), and 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Rela-
tions Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785, 831-34 (1969).
11 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962).
12 Id. at 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
13 See 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 785, 834 (1969).
14 414 F.2d 1326, 72 L.R.R.M. 2140 (2d Cir. 1969).
950
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
lective bargaining agreements had extensive work assignment provi-
sions and broad arbitration clauses.
The Recording Association demanded arbitration of its claim that
in assigning the work to the rival union CBS had breached the work
assignment provision contained in the collective bargaining agreement
between CBS and the Recording Association. In response to this
arbitration request CBS made a demand on the Engineers Union for
arbitration to determine whether the work should remain assigned
to members of that union, and then brought an action in the federal
district court to consolidate the two arbitrations.' The Recording
Association moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to compel joint arbitration because the En-
gineers Union was a stranger to its contract with CBS. The district
court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the joint arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
In upholding the decision of the district court the Second Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co." In Warrior the Court, defining the nature
of a collective bargaining agreement, stated:
The collective bargaining agreement . . . is more than a con-
tract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The col-
lective agreement covers the whole employment relationship.
It calls into being a new common law—the common law of a
particular industry or of a particular plant.17
In accordance with Warrior, the Second Circuit viewed the Re-
cording Association collective bargaining agreement as an integral
part of the entire relationship between the employer and all of his
employees, and not simply as an isolated document. The court observed
that the case closely paralleled Transportation-Communication Em-
ployees Union v. Union Pacific R.R.," in which the Supreme Court
upheld an order for tripartite arbitration under the Railway Labor
Act.' In Union Pacific it was argued that each union had a right to
the full benefit of its collective bargaining agreement and that tri-
partite arbitration might result in one of the unions losing some of
those bargained for rights. Justice Fortas, dissenting, accepted this
argument, pointing out that an order for tripartite arbitration suggests
that the work in question belongs to one union or another, whereas it
is possible that both unions have a bargained for right to the work.
If that is the case, when one union is assigned the disputed positions,
the other union is entitled to be recompensed for idleness attributable
19 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 293
F. Supp. 1400, 69 L.R.R.M. 2914 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
16 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
iT Id. at 578-79.
18 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
19 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
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to the loss of those positions.2° In view of the Court's policy to allow
"featherbedding" in the railroad industry,' this argument has validity
in situations involving work assignment disputes between unions sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act. It is not applicable
to cases arising under the LMRA, however, since under the Act the
practice of featherbedding is discouraged by the Board's power to
bring all parties together in a section 10(k) hearing to resolve a juris-
dictional work dispute by awarding the disputed position to one
union or another.
The CBS decision has opted for multipartite arbitration of work
assignment disputes between unions subject to the LMRA. If CBS is
followed in the other circuits, the difficult question of how to effectuate
meaningful arbitration in work dispute cases appears to be solved.
Since multipartite arbitration removes the possibility that one of the
unions will be treated unfairly the Board presumably will voluntarily
refuse jurisdiction when a prior award is made after multipartite arbi-
trations. The prospects for acceptance of CBS are difficult to evaluate
at this time. However the logic of the court appears to be sound, and
because there is no policy condoning featherbedding under the Act,
CBS presents an easier question than that already dealt with by the
Supreme Court in Union Pacific. Since no solution to the work dispute
problem is apparent, other than multipartite arbitration, adoption of
CBS by other circuits during the next Survey year may be anticipated.
V. CIVIL RIGHTS
In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.' decided during the Sur-
vey year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine
whether two employees have a right to engage, without union approval,
in peaceful concerted activities designed to persuade their employer
to hire Negroes. In resolving this issue the court was required to decide
to what extent Section 9(a) of the LMRA 2 limits or removes the pro-
tection provided by Section 7' of the Act. In section 7 Congress guar-
anteed that employees shall have the right to engage in concerted
20 The difficulty in Union Pacific was that automation had replaced jobs in both
unions.
21 See Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion in Union Pacific:
There is no basis for this Court to dictate—and that is what it is doing
here—that a collective bargaining contract may not be enforced in accordance
with its terms but must be subordinated to a one job, one man theory. This
Court cannot and should not impose its own views. The anti-featherbedding
principle may or may not be an admirable theory, depending upon one's precon-
ceptions and point of view. It does not now exist in the labor field. I respect-
fully suggest that this Court is in no position to assess the desirability of its
judicial innovation.
385 U.S. at 171.
1
 419 F.2d 216, 72 L.R.R.M. 2866 (9th Cir. 1969).
2 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
a 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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activities. In Section 9(a), on the other hand, Congress provided that
the union selected by the majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit shall be the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees
in the bargaining unit. Thus, activity which would otherwise be pro-
tected activity under section 7 may be deprived of that protection
because of the operation of section 9(a). The tension between sections
7 and 9(a) was early recognized in NLRB v. Draper Corp., 4 a decision
characterized by the Tanner court as a leading case in this area. In
Draper the court held that an employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice in discharging wildcat strikers because a wildcat strike
is not protected by section 7. In reaching this conclusion the court
noted that all employees must act through the bargaining agent selected
by the majority.
In Tanner two employees who were represented by the Chauffeurs
Union, Local 640 had been attempting to persuade the employer to
employ more Negroes. Both employees had picketed the employer's
place of business in order to protest what they considered to be dis-
criminatory hiring practices. After both employees had received dis-
charge notices from their employer, a complaint was filed with the
Board alleging that the employer discharged the two employees be-
cause they engaged in concerted activities.' The Board accepted the
trial examiner's finding that the two employees were discharged because
of their concerted activities, and, holding that the activities were pro-
tected by section 7, ordered the employer to cease interference and to
reinstate the employee who had not already been reinstated.' The
Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for
enforcement of its order. The court agreed with the Board that the
activity of the two employees constituted concerted activity within
the meaning of the Act, but decided that the Board had not given
consideration to the fact that a collective bargaining agreement existed
between the employer and the union. Noting that one of the chief
purposes of the Act is to foster the practice of collective bargaining,
the court remanded the case to the Board to consider to what extent
section 9, in which Congress articulated a policy favoring collective
bargaining, limits the protection afforded by section 7. 1
The Board reaffirmed its original order,' holding that it was
not necessary to consider whether the employees had ignored the
bargaining representative or whether they were "attempting to bargain
individually with their employer," because they were not acting in
derogation of their established bargaining agent.' The Board stated
that there was nothing to indicate that the union's status as collective
4 145 F.2d 199, 15 L.R.R.M. 580 (4th Cir. 1944).
5 NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. 349 F.2d 1, 59 L.R.R.M. 2784 (9th Cir.
1965).
6 Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 57 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1964).
7 349 F.2d at 1, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2784.
8 Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 65 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1967).
9 Id., 65 L.R.R.M. at 1503.
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bargaining agent had been in any way undermined. In addition the
Board noted that it should be presumed that the union had adopted a
position at least similar to that taken by the two employees because
the union must represent employees fairly, and such representation
includes a requirement that the union must neither practice nor tolerate
racial discrimination.
The decision of the Board was overturned this Survey year by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuie° The court held that
because the protest by the two employees involved a matter that was
a proper subject of bargaining between the union and the employer,
and because the union, under section 9(a), is vested with the task of
indicating the employees' interest, the employees' action was not
protected by section 7. Thus, the court concluded that the two em-
ployees had an obligation to go through the union to voice their desire
for nondiscrimination in hiring.
The court rejected the Board's argument that because the em-
ployees were not acting in derogation of their union that their activity
was protected. The court recognized that this position was supported by
an earlier case, NLRB v. R.C. Can Co.,' but rejected R.C. Can not-
ing that there is "a growing tendency to insure that an individual
member's views are aired inside the union." 12 To require employees
to act through their union in all situations where change is desired is,
the court stated, most in accord with the concept of orderly bargaining
which the Act seeks to promote.
The decision in Tanner limits the right of individual employees
to protest independently in support of their views. The decision of
the court, arrived at by balancing the interests section 7 was designed
to protect, against the policy expressed in section 9(a), requires that
employees seeking to end racial discrimination by their employer must
first attempt to prod their union into action.
As the court recognized, the difference between its holding in
Tanner and that in R.C. Can, and the difference between its view and
that of the Board reflect "disparate views of the union as an institu-
tion." The court has opted for that view which to a large extent
sacrifices the individual in order to promote the collective interest.
Although individual rights are compromised under this decision it
would appear that it is in the best interests of stable and peaceful
labor relations.
10
 NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216, 72 L.R.R.M. 2866 (9th
Cir. 1969).
11
 328 F.2d 974, 55 L.R.R.M. 2642 (5th Cir. 1964). In R. C. Can the court ruled
that if a union minority seeks to generate support for union demands, their actions are
protected as long as the means used do not involve a disagreement with a policy or
decision previously taken by the union.
12 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870. The court cited for this position NLRB
v. Allis -Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1966).
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VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
Under the language of section 8(d)' an employer, although he
in good faith meets with the employees' representative, may still
violate section 8(a) (5) 2 if he refuses to discuss the mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining as set down in section 8(d). Section 8(d) requires
the employer to bargain in good faith concerning wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. Much litigation in this
area has been concerned with the scope of the 8(d) requirements.
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB,' decided during the
Survey year, the Board held that an employer violated sections 8(a)
(1) and (5) of the NLRA by unilaterally changing a provision of
the company's collective bargaining agreement which entitled retired
employees to participate in the company's health insurance plan.
Retired employees of the company were covered by an insurance
plan which was incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement
between the company and the union. In 1966 the employer unilaterally
adjusted its insurance plan for retired employees. The union excepted
to the company's action, claiming that the employer had a duty to
bargain with the union about the change in benefits for the retired
employees. The trial examiner recommended dismissal of the com-
plaint on the ground that because retired employees are not employees
as defined in the Act' the company was under no statutory duty to
bargain with the union concerning the insurance plan for retirees, that
obligation ending on the date employees retire from active employment.
The Board, with Member Zagoria dissenting, did not accept
the recommendation of the trial examiner and held that the company's
unilateral change in the insurance plan for retired employees consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice, because retired employees are em-
ployees within the meaning of the statute for the purpose of bargaining
about changes in retirement benefits. Furthermore, the Board held,
bargaining about changes in retirement benefits for retired employees
is within the contemplation of the statute because of the interest
which active employees have in this subject. Bargaining about such
benefits is fully consonant with the statutory requirement that "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" be subject to
collective bargaining.
The Board in determining whether retired employees are to be
considered employees within the meaning of section 2(3) did not
merely refer to an isolated definition of employee, but rather con-
sidered the broad purposes of the Act, the fact that retirement benefits
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
2
 29 U.S.C. § I58(a) (5) (1964).
a 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969).
4 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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are in effect deferred compensation for work already performed, and
the fact that provision for economic security during retirement is a
real concern of those persons presently employed. In addition the
Board noted that retirement benefits are an integral part of bargained
for benefits. Having found, in light of these considerations, that retired
employees are employees within the meaning of the Act, the majority
concluded that the employer violated the statute by making unilateral
changes in the terms of an existing contract with respect to benefits
for retired employees.
In his dissent Member Zagoria stated that he was not in disagree-
ment with the principle that retirement plans are mandatory subjects
for collective bargaining when the proposed beneficiaries are currently
employed. However, in his opinion, because retired employees are no
longer working for the employer and have no hope of recall to employ-
ment, they should not be classified as employees. Since retired em-
ployees are not employees within the meaning of section 2(3), an
employer has no duty to bargain over changes that affect benefits
accruing to retired employees.
The holding of the majority in Pittsburgh Plate Glass has some
interesting ramifications. If the union can require the company to
bargain concerning payments to retirees it would seem that the
company can now insist on bargaining over decreases in such pay-
ments. Also, since retirees are now, in certain instances, to be con-
sidered employees, it is arguable that a duty of fair representation is
owed to them by the union.' The effects of Pittsburgh Plate Glass
will take some time to be determined. If subsequent decisions should
expand this decision so that retired employees are found to be owed
a duty of fair representation by a union in its contract negotiations,
a new factor will enter the collective bargaining process and a new
area of labor relations will be created.
B. Duty to Bargain
Section 8(a) (5) of the LMRA' provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees. Section 8(d) 2
 outlines the essentials
of the bargaining obligation. This section requires the employer to
bargain in "good faith" with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. • . ." A recurring difficulty in ruling on
the merits of a bad faith bargaining charge is identifying the precise
state of mind of the employer. This problem is increased by the fact
that section 8(d) does not compel the employer to agree to a proposal
or to make a concession.
During this Survey year an important case dealing with the duty
5 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
1
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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to bargain in good faith was decided by the Second Circuit in NLRB v.
General Elec. Co.3 In a lengthy and long-delayed opinion in which
General Electric's Boulwareism technique was examined, the court
upheld the Board's finding' that General Electric violated the LMRA 5
by its conduct during its 1960 contract negotiations. The court was
required to determine whether an employer may be guilty of bad
faith bargaining even though it reaches an agreement with the union.
The union charged that General Electric violated the duty to bargain
by failing to furnish information requested by the union, by attempt-
ing to deal separately with union locals, and by presenting to the union
a personal accident insurance program on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In 1955 General Electric and the International Union of Elec-
trical Workers entered into a five-year contract under which the
earliest date either party could compel the beginning of negotiations
for a new contract was August 16, 1960. In January of 1960, the union
and the company began a series of informal meetings. In June, 1960
the company notified the union that as of July, 1960 it would institute
a contributory group accident and life insurance plan, and stipulated
that if the union objected to the plan, only unrepresented employees
would receive the benefits. The union claimed that the company
had an obligation to bargain on this matter before instituting this uni-
lateral change. The company insisted that the collective bargaining
agreement between itself and the union expressly waived the duty to
bargain on matters concerning employee insurance and pensions.
The court held that the company violated section 8 (a) (5) 6 in
proposing the insurance plan unilaterally. The court ruled that under
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 7 insurance is a mandatory subject
of bargaining and thus, in a normal case, an employer violates sec-
tion 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain about insurance plan changes.
The case before the court was, as the court recognized, not a normal
case. The IUE-GE Pension and Insurance Agreement, which was still
in effect on the date of the company's action, provided that each party
waived the right to require the other to bargain as to pension and
insurance matters except during the stated negotiation period. General
Electric argued that it thus had a right to modify the insurance plan
without consulting the union, and that under section 8(d) neither
party need discuss nor agree to any modification of the terms of an
agreement during the term of that agreement. The court held that
the waiver by the union of its right to bargain concerning pension
and insurance matters did not give General Electric the right to
unilaterally propose a change in the contract. The court, accepting
the Board's interpretation of section 8(d) in Equitable Life Ins.
3 418 F.2d 763, 72 L.R.R.M. 2530 (2d Cir. 1969).
4 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (1964).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
6 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
7 179 F.2d 221, 25 L.R.R.M. 2281 (2d Cir. 1950).
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Co.,8 found that that section was designed to achieve peaceful indus-
trial relations through stable collective bargaining agreements which
guard the right of either party to a contract to hold firm to those terms
or conditions of employment which are specifically provided for in
writing. The court felt that to interpret section 8(d) in combination
with the waiver clause in the pension agreement, so as to allow the
company to increase or decrease benefits without bargaining with
the union, would destroy the stability that section 8(d) was designed
to promote. Section 8(d) was designed to protect the status quo and
may not be used as a "shield" by the party who disrupts the status
quo. The court noted in addition that as a matter of contractual inter-
pretation, it seemed unlikely that a union would ever have agreed to a
clause which had the effect which the company ascribed to the waiver
clause.
The company's contention that it had the right to grant benefits
unilaterally to non-union employees because otherwise the union would
"in effect have the ability to prevent non-Union employees from mak-
ing an independent choice on benefits'" was rejected by the court on
two grounds. The company's action, if its aim were to discourage
union membership, would violate section 8(a) (3)." Moreover, the
Equitable decision does not prohibit an employer from increasing
benefits during the term of an agreement; it merely requires the
employer to bargain with the union over proposed increases in benefits.
1. Refusal of GE to Furnish Information
The union alleged that GE violated section 8(a) (5) in refusing
during the formal negotiations of the 1960 contract to furnish informa-
tion to sustain the position taken by the company against certain
economic demands made by the union. For example, the union would
attempt to intiate bargaining for a particular benefit and the company
negotiators would label it as "astronomical" or "costly." When the
union asked for figures to back up the company's cost position the
response was "we talk level of benefits, not costs." On August 24 the
union asked the company to supply the number of employees with
twenty years of service so that the union might determine the cost of
a fourth week of vacation for employees with twenty or more years
of service. This request was made after the company had called a
demand by the union for vacation, "astronomical." The company
refused to supply the requested information indicating that the union
request was not warranted.
In NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co." the company, in response to a
union demand for a two and a half cent an hour raise, said that such an
increase would put it out of business, but refused to furnish the union
8
 133 N.L.R.B. 1675, 49 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1961).
9 418 F.2d at 749, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2539.
10 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
11
 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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with information to substantiate its position. The Supreme Court
held that the company in refusing to supply the information had
committed an unfair labor practice, and stated that:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made
by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true
about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If
such an argument is important enough to present in the give
and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some
sort of proof of its accuracy.'
The court in General Electric agreed with the Board and found
that GE committed an unfair labor practice in withholding the re-
quested information.' The court found that the information would have
significantly aided the union in its bargaining. The court concluded that
the purpose of collective bargaining is to promote the rational exchange
of facts and arguments which will increase the chance of a favorable
and just agreement, and that General Electric's actions were not di-
rected toward this end.
2. Bargaining Directly with Locals
For the ten years prior to the 1969 GE strike, the company and
the IUE had consistently negotiated on a nationwide scale. However,
just prior to the 1960 strike the company abandoned this pattern of
bargaining and began to deal separately with several of the IUE
locals. On September 29, the company notified the IUE that as of
October 1 it would consider its contractual obligation at an end.
The General Electric Employment Relations Manager offered a greater
increase in benefits to the Schenectady local than had been offered to
the national negotiators. The IUE filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging that the company's offer to the local was a violation of
section 8(a) (5). The trial examiner and the Board both found that
the company had committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining
directly with the locals. The Second Circuit agreed. The court's opinion
relied heavily on Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB,' 4
 where the
Supreme Court ruled that an employer, by negotiating directly with
union members concerning an increase in wages and ignoring the
union, had committed an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (5) because the union was not being treated as the section
9(a) "exclusive" bargaining representative."
12 Id. at 152-53.
13
 358 F.2d 591, 61 L.R.R.M. 2657 (1st Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966).
14 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
15 The Court noted that in Independent Stove Co. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 553, 60
L.R.R.M. 2408 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 962 (1966), the Supreme Court's
rational in Medo had been applied in finding a § 8(a) (5) violation where the employer
went behind the back of the exclusive representative and bargained directly with locals.
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3. Overall Refusal to Bargain in Good Faith
In addition to finding the specific violations of section 8(a) (5)
mentioned above, the Board also inferred an overall failure of good
faith bargaining from General Electric's conduct. In particular the
Board ruled that the company's approach to bargaining, when looked
at in its entirety, was designed to degrade the Union in the eyes of
the rank and file union members, and was thus indicative of the com-
pany's lack of good faith.
The bargaining technique used by General Electric, known as
"Boulwareism," is named after Lemuel Boulware, a vice president of
General Electric. The stated basis of this technique is the company's
determination to give the employee all that he is entitled to, but no
more. General Electric engages in year-round research in order to
determine the "best" offer it can make to its employees prior to con-
tract termination. The company then formulates an offer which is
the end result of its appraisal of the needs of the employees, the
company's level of profits and projected earnings, wages paid to related
industries and many other pertinent economic considerations. This
offer will not be changed unless objectively ascertainable information
is brought to the attention of the company which indicates that the
facts which had been determined by the company are incorrect."
The court, with Justice Friendly dissenting, found that the com-
pany's Boulwareism technique in the 1960 negotiations amounted to
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5). The majority of the
court, in upholding the Board's decision noted that in light of the
adverse effects, on the union, of take-it-or-leave-it proposals, the Board
could appropriately infer the presence of anti-union animus, and in
view of other similar conduct could reasonably discern a pattern of
illegal activity on the part of General Electric designed to subvert
the union. The company argued that the many concessions made by
the company during the contract negotiations, which under section
8(d) it was not obliged to make, were indicative of its good faith.
The majority in rejecting this contention found that few of the alleged
concessions by the company were substantial, and thus a strong
inference of good faith could not be made. In this regard, the court,
compelled to recognize section 8(d), which specifically states that
neither the employer nor the union is required to agree to a proposal
or to make a concession, stressed that it was not holding that the
absence of substantial concessions by General Electric is evidence of
bad faith.
A major factor influencing the majority's finding of an overall
refusal to bargain in good faith was the publicity program carried on
by General Electric. One of the essential ingredients in the Boulware
approach to collective bargaining is an intense publicity campaign to
communicate to the employees the company's "firm, fair offer" in
18
 Comment, "Boulwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 807 (1963).
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order to convince the employees that the company and not the union
is their true representative."' The trial examiner found that General
Electric chose to rely "entirely" on its communications program to
the virtual exclusion of meaningful negotiations. The court, in uphold-
ing the finding of the trial examiner, noted:
Having told its employees that it had made a "firm, fair
offer," that there was "nothing more to come," and that it
would not change its position in the face of "threats" or a
strike, had in effect rested all on the expectation that it could
institute its offer without significant modification."
The company argued that the court was prohibited by section
8(c) 19 from reviewing the company's publicity efforts. Section 8(c),
the company contended, should be read as prohibiting review of any
communication, in any manner, unless the communication itself con-
tains a threat or a promise of a benefit. The majority did not accept
this interpretation of section 8(c). They found that the legislative
history," past decisions,' and the logic of the statutory framework, 22
indicated that section 8(c) was not designed to immunize all statements
made in the course of a labor dispute except those containing threats
or promises.
The court stressed that in order to comply with the Board's order,
the company does not have to avoid "a carbon copy of every underlying
event relied on by the Board to support its findings." Rather, the
company must refrain from "combining" a "take-it-or-leave-it" bar-
gaining technique with a well publicized position of "unbending firm-
ness" that the company is "unable to alter a position once taken.""
It is this combination which constitutes a refusal to bargain "in fact"
and which constitutes a lack of subjective good faith.
17 418 F.2d at 759, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2548.
18 Id.
19 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
20 The majority cited a statement of Senator Taft:
It should be noted that this subsection is limited to "views, arguments, or
opinions" and does not cover instructions, directions, or other statements that
would ordinarily be deemed relevant and admissible in courts of law.
I Legislative History of the LMRA 1947, at 1541.
The majority noted that the "key" word is "relevant." Section 8(c) was designed
to prevent the Board from inferring the existence of an unfair labor practice from
unrelated, irrelevant speeches of an employer. The majority also noted that later ref-
erences to § 8(c) referred to the broad statements as those which were "severable or
unrelated," and "irrelevant or immaterial." 418 F.2d at 760, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
21 The majority noted that several cases dealing with this issue have held that
the Board may rely on employer's communications to infer the presence of a state of
mind inconsistent with the duty imposed by § 8(a)(5) to bargain in good faith, and
that communications have been relied upon to establish discriminatory treatment in
violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5). Id. at 761, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
22 The majority felt that since the Act in §§ 8(a) (1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) relies
heavily on the evaluation of motive and intent in proving employer unfair labor
practices, § 8(c) should not be read to eviscerate this policy. Id.
23 Id. at 773, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2559-60.
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Judge Friendly wrote a concurring and a dissenting opinion.
He agreed with the majority's finding that General Electric, by refus-
ing to furnish cost information and by bargaining directly with locals,
violated section 8(a) (5). He disagreed, however, with the finding of
the majority that General Electric violated section 8 (a) (5) by pro-
posing an insurance plan to the union on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In his opinion the language of the 1955 Pension and Insurance Agree-
ment explicitly waived the right of both the union and the company to
require bargaining over insurance matters. Moreover, section 8(d)
should not be read so as to prohibit an employer, during a period when
bargaining is not required, from "asking a union whether it will consent
to his giving a benefit to the employees whom it represents." Judge
Friendly also dissented from the majority's finding of an overall lack
of good faith on the part of General Electric during the bargaining
period, reasoning that a finding of bad faith should not be inferred
from an entire course of conduct unless "a desire not to reach an agree-
ment with the union" is shown, and that no such desire had been shown
in this case. He took strong exception to the majority's willingness to
infer from GE's publicity campaign an overall lack of good faith.
In his opinion GE's communications fell within the "views arguments,
or opinion" phrase of section 8(c) and were thus protected. Judge
Friendly does not feel that section 8(c) should be interpreted, as the
majority urges, to distinguish between communications by an employer
which are designed to prevent union organization and communications
made by an employer after union organization which are intended to
inform the employees that the employer is "doing right" by them and
that he will do no more under threat of a strike. He argued that the
very purpose of section 8(c) is to allow communications by an em-
ployer designed to influence workers to decide contrary to union
positions.
Judge Friendly also expressed concern over difficulties of enforc-
ing the Board's order, and over the application of the majority's
decision to future cases:
The only standard of conduct set for GE by the Board's
opinion is that a mix of the "fair, firm offer" technique pur-
sued to an unknown point, X, plus a communications program
pursued to an equally unknown point, 17, plus a number of
additional items, Z1, Z2, and Z3, is proscribed.
In conclusion, Judge Friendly stated that the holding contained
the seeds of danger not only for unions in their collective bargaining
rights but also for employees in the exercise of theirs. It also consti-
tuted "a serious indentation of §§ 8(c) and (d), if not, indeed, of
the First Amendment."'
This decision by the Second Circuit is significant because of the
finding by the majority that lack of good faith can be inferred from
24 Id. at 774, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2560.
962
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
the totality of circumstances without the necessity of delineation of
specific acts. This decision would seem to be in the best interests of
collective bargaining.
Boulwareism can be a very successful bargaining technique for
an employer if the union is divided. However, the technique can, when
bargaining power is equalized, lead to long and costly strikes. This
was evidenced by a 13-week strike by the TUE against General Electric
during the Survey year. Though the court's decision may have limited
to some extent General Electric's use of the Boulwareism technique,
it by no means ended its use. Boulwareism is a bargaining technique
which consists of numerous tactics. In this decision the court challenged
only the legality of the company's tactic of combining a "take-it-or-
leave-it" bargaining technique with a "widely publicized stance of
unbending firmness that . . . [the employer] is unable to alter a posi-
tion once taken."
Judge Friendly is correct in his assertion that the majority's
holding is open-ended. Difficulties will arise in determining what con-
stitutes a "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining technique. Moreover, the
extent to which an employer may publicize his views is uncertain. It
is the opinion of the writers of this year's Survey, however, that the
Board is competent to infer an absence of subjective good faith from
the stated combination of facts.
C. Union Discipline
During the Survey year in Molders, Local 125' (Blackhawk),
the Board held that it was an unfair labor practice in violation of
Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act for a union to fine an employee for
filing a decertification petition. By so holding the Board once again
raised the question of how the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) should
be interpreted when a union punishes one of its members for seeking
the aid of the Board. Section 8(b) states that
it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents ... to restrain or coerce ... employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] [of the Act]
. . . Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . 2
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,' in-
terpreted the language of the proviso to mean that the Act did not
reach the internal affairs of labor unions, and that therefore a union
could fine or expel one of its members for crossing a picket line even
though he was within his rights under Section 7 of the Act. Shortly
1 178 N.L.R.H. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
3 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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after Allis-Chalmers, however, the Court, faced with NLRB v. In-
dustrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers4 (Marine), de-
cided that a union member cannot be expelled by his union for filing
an unfair labor practice charge against his union with the Board. In
Marine the union member was expelled for filing an unfair labor
practice charge against the union in contravention of a union rule
which required him to exhaust all union remedies before invoking the
jurisdiction of the Board. The Court distinguished the situation from
Allis-Chalmers on the grounds that the employee, by invoking the
Board's jurisdiction, had placed the matter in the public domain, and
that for this reason the union discipline did not relate to wholly in-
ternal affairs. The Court reasoned that since the primary purpose of
the Board is to effectuate the national labor policy, and that since the
Board, which cannot initiate its own proceedings, is ultimately de-
pendant on individual initiative, the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge "is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of
the union."' Unimpeded access to the Board was guaranteed, there-
fore, after Marine.
Even at the time Marine was decided, however, the situation was
complicated by Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 6 in which the Board
held that it was not a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) for a union to
expel one of its members for filing a petition with the Board seeking
decertification of the union. Three reasons for its decision were given
by the Board. There was no attempt to affect the employee's job
interests; the employee was attacking the very existence of the union
and such an attack is the proper subject for union discipline; and the
union must be able to exclude hostile members during a certification
election campaign.'
At the time of the Blackhawk decision, therefore, it was permis-
sible for a union "to restrain or coerce" its members if such discipline
related to wholly internal union affairs. In addition, an employee
could be expelled for filing a decertification petition with the Board,
but no employee could be disciplined for bringing an unfair labor
practice charge against his union.
In Blackhawk the Board considered whether a union member
could be fined for filing a decertification petition. The Board held
that fining a union member for filing a decertification petition was a
violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). The majority agreed with prior
Board decisions which held that it was not a violation of the Act to
expel a union member for filing a decertification petition, recognizing
4 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
5 Id. at 425.
6 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
7 The Board reached this decision even though in an earlier case, Charles S. Skura,
148 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964), it had anticipated the Supreme Court's
holding in Marine by recognizing that union discipline which sought to regulate the
filing of unfair labor practices with the Board was in conflict with the overriding public
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the union's right to defend itself from hostile employees who threaten
its existence. But the majority reasoned that a fine did not have this
defensive characteristic because it did not exclude the member from
union activities.
Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented vigorously. They argued
that a fine was a lesser penalty than expulsion, and that it had already
been held by the Board in Cannery Workers Unions (Van Camp)
that both a fine and expulsion should be treated in the same way.
Van Camp did equate fines with expulsion. As the Board in Van
Camp indicated, the fact that a fine might be enforceable in court,
while expulsion might have no economic affect, does not distinguish
the two for the purposes of section 8(b) (1) since an expelled member
is equally harmed by losing the right to be heard in union activities
and elections. It is difficult, however, to see how Van Camp meets the
distinction between fines and expulsion made by the majority in
Blackhawk. Fines do not eliminate the union member from participa-
tion in the union and, therefore, do not possess the defensive charac-
teristic which justifies expulsion.
In the judgment of the Blackhawk majority, therefore, the simple
equation of fines and expulsion is not enough to justify the use of
fines when a member seeks decertification. It would appear that the
majority has asserted the importance of employees access to the
Board in section 9 cases. The question left by Blackhawk is whether
the Tawas Tube logic, grounded on a need for union self-preservation,
should prevail over the need for unrestricted access to the Board.
It is submitted that the majority was not correct in agreeing
with the holding in Tawas Tube that a union can expel] a union mem-
ber for filing a decertification petition. The majority acceptance of
Tawas Tube was premised upon the conviction that expulsion of a
union member is a defensive tactic necessary for the union's self-
preservation. The concern for union self-preservation was considered
to be of overriding importance.
It is true that expulsion can be defensive in nature, but this
policy consideration does not appear to be relevant since Marine
where the Court held that union regulation of access to the Board
processes was not a purely internal affair, and, therefore, was not
within the exception of the proviso. The reason it was not was that
the Act contemplated the effectuation of a national policy through the
initiative of individual persons, so access to the Board was a public
as well as an internal affair.
The question in Blackhawk, then, was whether a petition for de-
certification was in a similar way vested with a public as well as with
internal character. It would appear that it is. The hallmark of this
interest. In Skura the Board state that "No private organization should be permitted
to prevent or regulate access to the Board 	 . ." Id. 57 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
8 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 849-50, 62 L.R.R.M. 1298, 1301 (1966).
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characteristic as advanced in Marine was the dependence of the
Board on individual initiative and the importance of access to the
Board for the effectuation of the national labor policy. Section 9
petitions for decertification do not lack either of these hallmarks.
Under the logic of Marine, then, petitions for decertification are pub-
lic as well as internal affairs. The only question that can remain is
whether or not union disciplinary action in the form of fines or
expulsion is restrictive or coercive. The Marine court made no dis-
tinction between them, and specifically pointed out that expulsion,
even if it entailed no economic effect, was inherently coercive. It is
difficult to see how the majority can continue to make a distinction
of this kind.
Finally, the majority in Blackhawk appeared to suggest that even
if expulsion for filing a decertification petition is outside of the pro-
viso to section 8(b) (1), and even if it is coercive in nature, the union
may be justified because it needs to protect itself from the activities
of hostile members during the period of a representation election.°
Although it is true that this consideration distinguishes decertification
from unfair labor practice proceedings, it does not appear that the
language of section 8(b) (1) leaves room for such a distinction. It is
submitted that the Blackhawk majority is correct in finding that
fining a union member for filing a decertification petition is a violation
of section 8(b) (1), but that any suggestion that expulsion should be
treated differently is incorrect. For this reason, it would appear that
the Board decision in Tawas Tube should be re-examined in light of
Marine.
D. Secondary Boycotts: Product Picketing
Section 8(b) (4) (ii)(B) 1 represents an attempt by Congress to
prevent unions from conscripting neutrals into a dispute between a
union and an employer. One particular evil which this section is de-
signed to proscribe is the so-called secondary boycott, which occurs
when a secondary employer is compelled by union force to stop deal-
ing with the primary employer, the party with whom the union has its
labor dispute.
Section 8(b) (4) (ii)(B), despite its broad language, does not
prohibit all secondary picketing. In the leading case of NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
Fruits),2
 the Supreme Court ruled that union picketing at a retail
store which was limited to an appeal to customers not to purchase
Washington State apples from the store because the apples were
marketed by employers with whom the union was involved in a labor
dispute, did not violate section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Court noted
that the union's activities might be found to be prohibited by section
9
 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1964).
2 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) if that section were to be read literally. The Court,
however, chose to avoid a literal reading of the section since to pro-
hibit conduct of the type complained of would be inconsistent with
the spirit of the Act. The Court's reasoning was based on the distinc-
tion between peaceful consumer picketing at a secondary site aimed
at persuading customers of the secondary employer to cease dealing
with the secondary employer completely, and that which is only
aimed at persuading the consumer to boycott the product of the
struck employer. The Court reasoned that if this latter type of picket-
ing is successful the secondary employer's purchases from the primary
employer are decreased only because of the falling demand, whereas
if the former type of picketing is successful it is because of the sec-
ondary employer's response to union pressure "designed to inflict
injury on business generally." The Court concluded that there was no
clear indication that Congress intended peaceful consumer picketing
of the former type to be prohibited.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tree Fruits left many issues in
the area of secondary boycotts unresolved. In Kennedy v. Typo-
graphical Union,3
 decided during the Survey year, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California was asked by the
Regional Director of the Board to grant a temporary injunction
restraining striking unions from picketing a retailer with signs re-
questing that the public not buy goods advertised by the retailer in
the primary employer's newspaper.
The union argued that its picketing fell within the protection
afforded by the Tree Fruits doctrine. The court noted, however, that
there were differences between the facts in Tree Fruits and the facts of
the case at bar. In Tree Fruits there was a "tangible" and "identifi-
able" product which could be traced from the struck employer to the
retail store. In this case, however, there was no such product passing
from the struck employer to the retailer.' The court pointed out that
the retailer bought advertising from the struck employer, but it did
not resell the advertising to the consumer as Safeway sold apples.
Though the court did not discuss the effect of this distinction on the
validity of the picketing, it did recognize that a similar situation
existed in Honolulu Typographical Union v. NLRB. 5 Indeed, the
petitioner in Kennedy argued that under the Typographical case the
petition for the temporary injunction should be allowed.
In Honolulu the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with a more complex situation than that encountered by the
Supreme Court in Tree Fruits. The court found a section 8(b) (4)
(ii) (B) violation when a union picketed restaurants which adver-
3 71 L.R.R.M. 2134 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
4 The court did indicate that to some extent the picketing followed the struck
product by dissuading those who were attracted to the retailer by the struck newspaper
from acting upon the advertisement. Id. at 2135.
5 401 F.2d 952, 68 L.R.R.M. 3004 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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tised in a newspaper against whom the union was on strike. The court
distinguished Tree Fruits on the ground that the picketing, because
the restaurants advertised their complete business in the struck
newspaper, was an attempt by the union to convince customers to
cease dealing with the restaurant completely. Thus, the picketing if
successful would result in a total boycott of the secondary employer's
business. Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Tree Fruits
that such picketing is one of the "isolated evils" Congress sought to
protect against, the court held that section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) had been
violated.
Despite the similarity between the facts in Kennedy and those
in Typographical the court refused to grant an injunction. The court
pointed out that in Typographical the question of whether secondary
picketing is legal if it is limited to requesting customers to boycott
"particular" advertised products was not decided. The facts in Ken-
nedy indicate that the union picketing was not directed at the second-
ary party's "entire business," but rather was limited to a request that
the customers of the secondary employer refuse to buy goods adver-
tised by the retailer in the struck employees newspaper. The
advertisements in the struck employer's newspaper were not adver-
tisements for the retailer's entire business, but rather depicted a
number of items sold at the retailer's stores. Thus the court refused
to expand Typographical to cover the facts of Kennedy. Moreover
the court noted that the facts of Kennedy were such that a balancing
of the interest of the union against the interests of the neutral em-
ployer is required to determine if the picketing is prohibited by
8(b) (4) (ii) (B). This balancing, the court felt, should be decided by
the Board in the first instance because of the Board's expertise con-
cerning labor matters. The Court therefore denied the request for an
injunction.
The Kennedy case, though it only involved a request for an
injunction by the Regional Director and was not an appeal from a
Board decision, raises interesting problems concerning the effect the
decision in Typographical had in limiting the Tree Fruits doctrine. It
is obvious that the cases involving newspaper strikers picketing ad-
vertisers raise questions that are not easily answered by Tree Fruits.
It is the view of the members of this year's Survey that if picket-
ing is limited to a request that customers not purchase products
which are advertised in the primary employer's newspaper, and if
under the particular facts of the case the request does not in fact
amount to a request that the secondary employer's entire business be
boycotted, then Tree Fruits indicates that picketing should be pro-
tected. When the advertising of the secondary employer becomes so
extensive as to support an inference that in effect the picketing will
result in a total boycott of the secondary employer's business, it
would seem that under Tree Fruits, the picketing should be prohibited.
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E. Checkoli Provisions
During this Survey year the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter Co.,
v. NLRB,' for the first time in over four years, reversed a decision
of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court held that the
Board has no power to order an employer to accede to a contract
provision providing for a checkoff of union dues, even though the
employer violated the Act by repeatedly refusing to bargain in good
faith on the checkoff issue.
In 1961 the Steelworkers Union was certified by the Board as the
bargaining representative for the employees at the Danville, Virginia
plant of the petitioner, H.K. Porter Co. A short time later negotiations
for a collective bargaining agreement commenced. The union desired
a clause in the contract providing for a "checkoff"' of the dues owed
to the union by its members. The company objected to the union
proposal for the stated reason that it was "not going to aid and comfort
the union." The Board found that the company's refusal to bargain
about the "checkoff" was not made in good faith, but rather was de-
signed to frustrate the making of any collective bargaining agreement. 3
The court of appeals upheld the Board's order requiring the company
to cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith and directing
it to engage in further good faith bargaining. 4
 In its opinion the court
of appeals intimated that the Board could have required the company
to agree to a checkoff provision as a remedy for its prior bad faith
bargaining.5
During the negotiations following the decision of the court of
appeals the union insisted that the company was required to agree to
the union's checkoff proposal without modification. The company
disagreed with the union's interpretation of the court's opinion, argu-
ing that section 8(d) 5
 did not require it to agree to the checkoff
provision. Section 8(d) requires the employer and the union to confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and the other terms and
conditions of employment. However, it states that "such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession."
When the company continued to refuse to agree to a checkoff
provision the union filed a motion for a clarification of the 1966
opinion of the court of appeals. The motion was granted and the
court issued a new opinion in which it held that in certain circum-
1 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
2 Under a "checkoff" agreement the company agrees to deduct from the employees
pay the dues owed to the union.
3 H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 59 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1965).
4 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272. 62 L.R.R.M. 2204 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966).
6 Id. at 275-76, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
6 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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stances a checkoff provision may be imposed on the employer as a
remedy for bad faith bargaining.' The case was then remanded to the
Board which issued an order requiring the petitioner to grant to the
union a contract clause for the checkoff of union dues.' The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this order.° Ap-
peal was then taken by the company to the Supreme Court which
granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court, with Justices Douglas and Stewart dissent-
ing, ruled that the Board does not have the power under the LMRA
to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contract-
ual provision." In reaching its decision the majority, speaking through
Justice Black, relied heavily on the objectives of the Act as ennun-
ciated in the congressional debates prior to its enactment. The Court
found that the Act was not designed to allow governmental regulation
of the terms and conditions of employment. Rather, the Act contem-
plates that through open discussions the collective bargaining process
will lead to mutual agreement. Justice Black noted that this basic
premise has been long recognized and that the Board had never in the
history of the Act ordered an employer or a union to agree to a sub-
stantive term in a collective bargaining agreement.
In affirming the Board's order, the court of appeals had stressed
that section 8(d) does not expressly forbid the Board from compel-
ling agreement. In this regard the court stated that section 8(d) is
only applicable in determining whether a violation has occurred and
does not limit the scope of the remedy which may be necessary to
cure violations which have already occurred."
The majority of the Supreme Court agreed that section 8(d), if
strictly and literally interpreted, is only relevant to deciding whether
a violation has occurred, but held that when section 8(d) is read in
conjunction with the Act as a whole it is clear that Congress only in-
tended to give the Board the power to oversee the process of collective
bargaining, and was content to leave with the parties the right to
agree or not to agree.
The dissenting justices accepted the majority's reasoning that
the Board does not sit to impose substantive provisions on either the
employer or the union. Thus, in the normal case the Board cannot
require either bargaining party to make a concession. The dissenters
argued, however, that where one party does not bargain in good faith
the Board has the power under Section 10(c)" of the Act "to take such
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies" of the Act, and
that it can, in the exercise of its remedial power, impose a provision
in the collective agreement that was not agreed upon by both bar-
7 United Steelworkers v. NLRB. 389 F.2d 295, 66 L.R.R.M. 2761 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
8 H.K. Porter Co., 397 N.L.R.B. 99, 68 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1968).
9 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123, 71 L.R.R.M. 2207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
10 397 U.S. at 109.
11 389 F.2d at 299, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
12 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
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gainers if such action is necessary to remedy on employer's "flagrant"
refusal to bargain in good faith.
F. Back Pay
The law establishing an employer's obligation to reinstate
strikers is well settled. Economic strikers who have been replaced are
not entitled to immediate reinstatement on demand, but they must be
offered jobs as they become available.' Unfair labor practice strikers
must be returned upon demand to their former positions, even if the
employer in order to make room for the returning strikers must dis-
charge the employees hired as replacements.' Refusal by an employer
to reinstate a striker who has unconditionally made himself available
for work and who is entitled at that time to be returned to his job
constitutes a violation of 8(a) (3). 3
In Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co.' the Board ruled that when
unfair labor practice strikers desire to terminate a strike they are
entitled to seek and receive immediate reinstatement as a group. If
the employer fails to reinstate the employees upon unconditional ap-
plication, the employees are entitled to wages from the date of appli-
cation. Moreover, piecemeal offers of reinstatement to some unfair
labor practice strikers who unconditionally applied for reinstatement
are not valid offers, and hence do not toll an employer's back pay
obligation with respect to all strikers who rejected such offers.
In Southwestern Pipe, Inc.,' decided during the Survey year, the
Board, with two members dissenting, expressly overruled its decision
in Abbott Publishing by holding that an unfair labor practice striker
may refuse an offer of reinstatement without losing his status as a
striker because the employer has not made a similar offer to other
strikers who are also entitled to immediate reinstatement, but he can-
not continue to strike and demand that his employer pay him for not
working.
The impetus behind the decision of the majority in overruling
Abbott Publishing was their dissatisfaction with a rule which allows
an employee to strike and also receive full pay from his employer.
The majority adopted the language of Member Fanning's dissent in
Abbott Publishing: "The Act does not protect an employee from loss
of wages as the result of a strike even though the strike was caused
by an unfair labor practice. An employee who prefers concerted activ-
ity to the status of "strike breaker" cannot sup at both tables."'
1 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
2 Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452, 9 L.R.R.M. 563 (7th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 1964).
4 139 N.L.R.B. 1328, 51 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1962), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 964). The Board's position on the proper remedy for refusal to reinstate an
unfair labor practice striker was not discussed by the court.
5 179 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 72 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1969).
e Id., 72 L.R.R.M. at 1380.
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The dissenters argued that the rule established in Abbott Pub-
lishing should be adhered to because the holding of the majority
enables the employer to pit certain members of the union against
other members by "forcing some to act as strikebreakers under
penalty of loss of wages."
It would seem that the opinion of the majority is preferable. It
in no way changes the right of an unfair labor practice striker to re-
instatement. It simply holds that when an employer offers a striker
reinstatement in his former job, but does not offer such reinstatement
to similar strikers, the employee has a choice. He can return to work
or continue to strike. He cannot, however, continue to strike and
expect to be paid.
It should be noted that because of the threat of a large back pay
award an employer will be less apt to commit another unfair labor
practice by refusing to reinstate all unfair labor practice strikers re-
questing reinstatement. However, this position fails to consider the
situation where it is not certain whether the strike is in fact an
economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike. In many cases it
is not clear what type of strike the union's activity constitutes, and
this question may take many years of litigation to answer. If the em-
ployer mistakenly believes that the strikers are engaged in an eco-
nomic strike and there are no positions available, a refusal to rein-
state, though proper if in fact an economic strike existed, would
subject the employer to liability for back pay. In a situation where
an employer is in doubt as to the type of strike, he may, under the
threat of large back pay awards, be forced to rehire strikers he would
otherwise not rehire.
G. Reinstatement
Section 10(c) in part provides that the Board may "take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies" of the Act.1 In
Richland, Inc.,2
 decided during the Survey year, the Board ruled that
an employer violated Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing
to bargain with the union concerning the employer's decision to install
automated equipment, and also found that the employer's decision
was discriminatorily motivated and was thus in violation of section
8(a) (1) and 8(a)(3).
In the past in such a situation the Board has, in exercising its
expressed authority pursuant to section 10(c), ordered the employer
to cease using the equipment and to rehire all the discriminatorily
discharged employees.8
 However, in Richland, Inc. the Board aban-
1
 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
2
 180 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 73 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1969).
3
 Id., 73 L.R.R.M. at 1020. See also Savoy Laundry, Inc., 50 L.R.R.M. 1127
(1962). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused, because it would be
"unduly harsh," to enforce that part of the Board's order requiring the employer to
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doned use of this extreme remedy and not only refused to require the
employer to cease using the equipment, but also refused to order the
employer to rehire all the aggrieved employees. Instead the Board
ordered only the reinstatement of one of the three discharged engi-
neers and accompanied this limited reinstatement order with a back-
pay requirement designed to make the employees whole from the time
of the dismissal until the discharged employees have been offered
reinstatement or found similar employment. In addition the order of
the Board required the employer to place the two employees on a
professional hiring list. Thus, if in the future work becomes available
these employees win, if they still seek employment, be the first hired.
The decision of the Board in Richland, Inc. varies from its
normal order in such situations, but in light of the harshness of the
remedy formerly utilized by the Board in such situations it seems to
be correct. The Board's limited order partially compensates the
employees for their lost wages caused by the employer's discrimina-
tory discharge, without placing on the employer the burden of not
being allowed to use its new equipment. This decision by the Board
would seem to be the correct one in light of the facts of the case. As
the Board recognized, if the employer had been required to reinstate
all three engineers when, because of the new equipment, there was
only work for one, the Board would be requiring featherbedding.
JOHN P. BIRMINGHAM, JR.
WILLIAM T. SHERRY ., JR,
restore his business to the status quo before the discrimination, NLRB v. Savoy Laundry,
Inc., 327 F.2d 370, 55 L.R.R.M. 2285 (2d Cir. 1964).
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